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Finding a "Manifest Imbalance": The Case for a Unified 
Statistical Test for Voluntary Affirmative Action Under 
Title VII 
Twenty-five years have passed since Congress enacted the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, and yet stark disparities continue to exist between 
whites and blacks, and often men and women, in income, housing, 
health care, and education.1 Some of the most striking of these dispar-
ities can be found in employment, where, despite Title VIl's prohibi-
tion of race and sex discrimination, 2 large segments of the American 
work force remain distinctly segregated along racial and gender lines.3 
The occupational segregation that once was enforced by overt discrim-
ination is today perpetuated by more subtle forms of discrimination 
and, perhaps more decisively, by the continuing disparities in educa-
tion, family background, and other indicators of life chances. 4 
1. See generally Pettigrew, New Patterns of Racism: The Different Worlds of 1984 and 1964, 
37 RUTGERS L. REV. 673, 673-86 (1985). 
2. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982). Section 
703(a) of the Act, 78 Stat. 255 (1964), as amended by 86 Stat. 109 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)), provides that "it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way 
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or 
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin. 
3. Blacks in 1980, for example, comprised only 2.6% of all engineers, 2.7% of all lawyers, 
3.1 % of all physicians, and just more than 5% of all carpenters and electricians; at the same 
time, blacks made up nearly 35% of all garbage collectors and more than 40% of all household 
servants. See Pettigrew, supra note 1, at 677-78. Occupational segregation according to sex also 
remains striking. See SEX SEGREGATION IN THE WORKPLACE (B. Reskin ed. 1984); WOMEN 
AND THE WORKPLACE (M. Blaxall & B. Reskin eds. 1976); WOMEN'S WORK, MEN'S WORK: 
SEX SEGREGATION ON THE JOB (B. Reskin & H. Hartman eds. 1986); Blau & Ferber, Occupa-
tions and Earnings of Women Workers, in 'WORKING WOMEN: PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE 37-68 
(K. Koziara, M. Moskow & L. Tanner eds. 1987); Rhode, Occupational Inequality, 1988 DUKE 
L. J. 1207, 1208-12; Note, Getting Women Work That Isn't Women's Work: Challenging Gender 
Biases in the Workplace Under Title Vil 97 YALE L.J. 1397, 1397-98 & nn.3-5 (1988). 
Generally, the statistics show measurable but uneven progress toward integrating many occu-
pational 'categories. Compare Blumrosen, Expanding the Concept of Affirmatfre Action to Ad-
dress Contemporary Conditions, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 297 (1984-1985) (noting 
affirmative action's contribution toward ending occupational segregation) with Seymour, Re· 
sponse, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 321 (1984-1985) (arguing that Blumrosen's statistics 
do not adequately reflect the extent of continuing occupational segregation). See generally R. 
FARLEY & W. ALLEN, THE COLOR LINE AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE IN AMERICA 256-82 
(1987). 
4. A report by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights recently described this effect: 
Discrimination has become a process that builds the discriminatory attitudes and actions 
of individuals into the operations or organizations and social structures (such as education, 
employment, housing and government). Perpetuating past injustices into the present, and 
1986 
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Although some observers have insisted upon attributing these dispari-
ties to the differing "interests," "skills," or "choices" of various racial 
or gender groups, 5 the Supreme Court has generally been less reluc-
tant to admit the role played by a long national history of race and sex 
discrimination. 6 
manifesting itself through statistically measurable inequalities that are longstanding and 
widespread, this discriminatory process produces unequal results along the lines of race, sex, 
and national origin, which in turn reinforce existing practices and breed damaging stereo-
types which then promote existing inequalities that set the process in motion in the first 
place. 
U.S. COMMN. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN THE 1980s: DISMANTLING THE 
PROCESS OF DISCRIMINATION 5 (1981). See generally Rhode, supra note 3 (analyzing the com-
plex role of past discrimination in perpetuating current sex segregation in employment). 
5. See, e.g., Abram, Affirmative Action: Fair Shakers and Social Engineers, 99 HARV. L. 
REv. 1312, 1315 (1986): 
Because groups - black, white, Hispanic, male, and female - do not necessarily have 
the same distribution of, among other characteristics, skills, interest, motivation, and age, a 
fair shake system may not produce proportional representation across occupations and pro-
fessions, and certainly not at any given time. This uneven distribution, however, is not 
necessarily the result of discrimination. 
and Loury, Why Should We Care About Group Inequality?, 5 Soc. PHIL. & POLY. 249, 249-50 
(1987): 
Why should the mere existence of group disparities evidence the oppressive treatment of 
individuals? There is little support in the historical record for the notion that, in the absence 
of oppression based upon group membership, all socially relevant aggregates of persons 
would achieve roughly the same distribution of economic rewards. Indeed, to hold this view 
is to deny the economic relevance of historically determined and culturally reinforced be-
liefs, values, interests, and attitudes which constitute-the defining features of distinct ethnici-
ties. Distinct cultures will necessarily produce distinct patterns of interest and work among 
their adherents. 
See also T. SOWELL, CIVIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR REALITY? 42-46 (1984); Williams, Decon-
structing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REv. 797, 821, 825 (1989) (reviewing arguments that women's 
underrepresentation in certain job categories and overall sex-based wage disparities can be ex-
plained by women's career-interests rather than discrimination). 
6. Compare, e.g., Professor Loury's statement, supra note 5, with International Bhd. of 
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 n.20 (1977) ("[A]bsent explanation, it is ordinarily 
to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time result in a work force more or 
less representative of the racial and ethnic composition of the population of the community from 
which employees are hired."). · 
See also Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 370-71 (1978) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) ("Davis clearly could conclude that the serious and persistent 
underrepresentation of minorities in medicine depicted by these statistics is the result of handi-
caps under which minority applicants labor as a consequence of a background of deliberate, 
purposeful discrimination against minorities in education and in society generally .... "); 438 
U.S. at 395-96 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part): 
The position of the Negro today in America is the tragic but inevitable consequence of 
centuries of unequal treatment. · 
The relationship between those figures [outlining modern oecupational segregation] and 
the history of unequal treatment afforded to the Negro cannot be denied. At·every point 
from birth to death the impact of the past is reflected in the still disfavored·position of the 
Negro. · 
Justice Powell, writing for the plurality, did not dispute the inference of societal discrimination, 
but instead rejected societal discrimination as an adequate predicate for affirmative action under 
the equal protection clause. See 438 U.S. at 307. 
But see City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 726 (1989) ("There are numer-
ous explanations for this dearth of minority participation [in Richmond's construction industry], 
including past societal discrimination in education and economic opportunities as well as both 
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In the past twenty years, the use of hiring or promotional prefer-
ences favoring traditionally disadvantaged groups has become one of 
the most frequent and effective tools for ending occupational segrega-
tion. 7 Affirmative action plans are now said to number, by one esti-
mate, in the "hundreds of thousands" and members of the business 
community have become some of their most enthusiastic proponents. 8 
Throughout this period, however, there has often been uncertainty 
over the circumstances under which an employer could voluntarily 
adopt such a plan without risking Title VII liability to majority em-
ployees. Before the Court's 1979 opinion in United Steelworkers of 
America v. Weber, 9 it was not at all clear that private employers could 
ever voluntarily adopt affirmative action. 10 Weber settled at least that 
much, holding that an employer could use affirmative action without 
violating Title VII if the plan was justified by "manifest racial imbal-
ances in traditionally segregated job categories."11 Such a "manifest 
black and white career and entrepreneurial choices. Blacks may be disproportionately attracted 
to industries other than construction."). 
The Court's recent ruling$ in Croson and Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 57 U.S.L.W. 
4583 (1989) (rejecting a claim of disparate-impact discrimination under Title VII based on intra-
work force statistical comparisons and requiring Title VII plaintiffs to carry the burden of prov-
ing absence of "business necessity" of challenged employment practices) may fairly be taken as a 
signal, however, of a growing reluctance on the Court to infer discrimination from the existence 
of racial or gender group inequalities. See Greenhouse, The Court's Shift to Right, N.Y. Times, 
June 7, 1989, at Al, col. 1. Those rulings led Justice Blackmun, in a short, stinging dissent to 
Atonio, to "wonder[] whether the majority still believes that race discrimination - or, more 
accurately, race discrimination against nonwhites - is a problem in our society, or even remem-
bers that it ever was." 57 U.S.L.W. at 4593 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
7. See Blumrosen, supra note 3 (attributing progress in ending occupational segregation to 
affirmative action programs); Goldner, Affirmative Action: Passing the Test?, AM. LAW., Oct. 
1987, at 29 (case study of affirmative action admissions program at UCLA Law School); 
Schwartz, The 1986 and 1987 Affirmative Action Cases: It's All Over But the Shouting, 86 MICH. 
L. REv. 524, 572-73 (1987) (citing studies and concluding that "few other remedies work as well 
or as quickly"); Smith, Review: Affirmative Action, 27 How. L. J. 495, 516-17 (1984). 
8. BUREAU OF NATL. AFFAIRS, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION TODAY 101-43 (1986); Norton, 
Equal Employment Law: Crisis in Interpretation - Survival Against the Odds, 62 TUL. L. RBV. 
681, 686 n.17, 713-14 (1988); Schwartz, supra note 7, at 525 & n.11 ("The 1987 decisions (up-
holding affirmative action] were ... enthusiastically received by the business community."); 
Note, Rethinking Weber: The Business Response to Affirmative Action, 102 HARV. L. REV. 658, 
661-62 (1989). 
9. 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
10. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 302 (1978) (opinion of Powell, 
J.) ("(W]e have never approved preferential classifications in the absence of proved constitutional 
or statutory violations."). 
11. 443 U.S. at 197. There is also a second prong to Weber's test of voluntary affirmative 
action: Once the employer has shown the requisite "manifest imbalance" predicate, it must then 
be able to demonstrate that its plan "does not unnecessarily trammel the interests of (majority] 
employees." 443 U.S. at 208. Among the factors considered relevant to the Weber Court in 
making this second determination were the plan's temporary nature; the fact that the plan did 
not "create an absolute bar to the advancement of [majority] employees," nor require their dis-
charge; and that the plan "is not intended to maintain racial balance, but simply to eliminate a 
racial imbalance." 443 U.S. at 208. The relevance of these factors, and of the second prong 
itself, was reaffirmed in Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S. 
616, 637-40 (1987) (discussed more fully infra at Section I.C). 
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imbalance," the Court held, was sufficient to ensure· that affirmative 
action was being used remedially as a cure for past discrimination.12 
What has remained disputed, however, is whether an employer is free 
to use affirmative action aimed at remedying a manifest imbalance in 
its work force caused not by its own prior discrimination, but by wider 
societal discrimination. 13 
The waters have been muddied by the recent line of equal protec-
tion cases culminating in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. in which 
the Court seems to have rejected societal discrimination as a compel-
ling governmental interest sufficient to justify a public affirmative ac-
tion plan under a strict-scrutiny analysis. 14 These constitutional cases 
led some courts to conclude that the Court meant to require a showing 
of past discrimination by any employer, public or private, wishing to 
adopt affirmative action, regardless of whether the plan was chal-
lenged under Title VII or the equal protection clause of the fourteenth 
amendment. 15 Even after the Court's recent ruling in Johnson v. 
12. See 443 U.S. at 208; 443 U.S. at 216 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Johnson v. Transporta-
tion Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S. 616, 632 (1987); see also infra note 19 and 
accompanying text. 
13. "Societal discrimination" is used here simply to connote discriminatory acts not directly 
attributable to the employer seeking to adopt affirmative action. Such acts might include, inter 
alia, the exclusion of women or minorities from craft unions, job training programs, or other 
educational facilities essential to effective competition in the employment market. 
14. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989) (majority applying strict 
scrutiny to benign racial classification in set-aside program for city contracting); Wygant v. Jack-
son Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (plurality holding unconstitutional city's collective bar-
gaining agreement provision granting limited preference to minority teachers in layoff decisions); 
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (plurality striking down inflexible racial 
quota in admissions to state university medical school). 
15. Eight years after Weber, for example, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit relied heavily on the Supreme Court's constitutional analysis to find that a race-conscious 
hiring plan voluntarily adopted by the Washington, D.C., fire department violated Title VII. 
Hammon v. Barry, 813 F.2d 412 (Hammon!), rehg. denied, 826 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. 
denied, 108 S. Ct. 2023 (1988). Hammon I perhaps epitomizes the confusion that has beset some 
courtS over the appropriate standards to be applied depending upon whether the disputed plan 
was voluntarily adopted or ordered by a court, and whether it is challenged under Title VII or 
the equal protection clause. In Hammon l the court of appeals noted that the Supreme Court 
had ruled in Wygant that affirmative action programs adopted by public employers are constitu-
tional only if the plans are necessary to remedy past discrimination by the employer itself. It also 
looked to Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986), in which the Court 
suggested that affirmative action plans should be imposed by a court order only where the em-
ployer itself is guilty of past discrimination. The court then reasoned that Weber, read in the 
light of Wygant and Sheet Metal Workers, meant to validate affirmative action only in cases in 
which it was employed to remedy past discrimination by the employer; if there were insufficient 
evidence to suggest that the employer had itself engaged in discriminatory practices, then affirm-
ative action would violate Title VII and, if the employer were a governmental unit, the four-
teenth amendment as well. See 813 F.2d at 420-25. Under this approach, which was clearly 
rejected in Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S. 616 (1987), 
the restraints placed upon private affirmative action by Title VII would run essentially parallel to 
the restraints imposed by the fourteenth amendment upon state actors, and affirmative action 
would be permissible voluntarily only where it could likely be ordered by a court after trial, i.e., 
where the employer has violated Title VII or the fourteenth amendment by past discrimination. 
The Court in Johnson made clear, however, that the restraints imposed by Title VII fall short of 
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Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, California, 16 in which the 
Court unequivocally distinguished Title VII from constitutional con-
straints on affirmative action, some observers insist that the Court's 
equal protection cases imply a requirement of past employer discrimi-
nation as a predicate for voluntary affirmative action under Title VII 
as well. 17 
The question of whether a private employer may adopt affirmative 
action aimed at remedying societal discrimination rather than merely 
its own discriminatory acts has significant implications for the reach of 
affirmative action in the private sector. The answer will determine 
whether newer private employers that could be shown conclusively 
never to have discriminated may nonetheless use affirmative action to 
remedy manifest imbalances in their work forces caused by past socie-
tal discrimination. More importantly, if employers are permitted to 
use affirmative action to reach societal discrimination alone, that calls 
into question the usefulness of the statistical formulation endorsed by 
the Court in Johnson for determining when the requisite "manifest im-
balance" exists. Reforming the statistical test around a more explicit 
societal discrimination predicate would allow private employers to 
remedy voluntarily a broader range of racial and gender imbalances, 
turning affirmative action into a more effective vehicle for breaking 
down traditional patterns of occupational segregation, a driving pur-
pose of Title VII. 18 
those imposed by the Constitution, and also that voluntary programs are to be judged more 
leniently than those involuntarily imposed. 480 U.S. at 627 n.6, 630 n.8. 
16. 480 U.S. 616 (1987). 
17. See, e.g., Hammon v. Barry, 826 F.2d 73, 80-81 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Hammon //}, cert. 
denied, 108 S. Ct. 2023 (1988) (Johnson did not alter required predicate of past discrimination by 
employer adopting remedy); D. MCDOWELL, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AFTER THE JOHNSON DE-
ClSION 105 (1987) ("Plans designed to meet the effects of 'Societal Discrimination' ••• are ex-
tremely suspect."). 
Some other observers have adopted a more agnostic point of view. See, e.g., Kirp & Weston, 
The Political Jurisprudence of Affirmative Action, 5 Soc. PHIL. & POLY. 223, 243-44 (1987) (rais-
ing the question, "What showing of past discrimination - either by the institution or in society 
at large - is required before race consciousness is warranted ..• ?,'' and treating it as one of the 
"fundamental legal questions" left unresolved after Johnson). 
The relationship between the constitutional and statutory limitations on affirmative action 
has long puzzled a number of lower courts. See generally Rutherglen & Ortiz, Affirmative Action 
Under the Constitution and Title VIL· From Confusion to Convergence, 35 UCLA L. REV. 467 
(1988); Note, Voluntary Public Employer Affirmative Action: Reconciling Title VII Consent De· 
crees with the Equal Protection Claims of Majority Employees, 28 B.C. L. REV. 1007, 1030-34 
(1987) (reviewing the confusion faced by some lower courts during the interval between Weber 
and Johnson). 
Even after the Court's explicit insistence in Johnson that the statutory and constitutional tests 
for affirmative action are not the same, the analyses continue to be occasionally intermingled. 
See, e.g., Cygnar v. City of Chicago, 865 F.2d 827 (7th Cir. 1989) (applying Johnson's "manifest 
imbalance" test to determine constitutionality of City's affirmative action plan). 
18. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 208 (Title VII was "designed to break down old patterns of racial 
segregation and hierarchy. [It was] structured to 'open employment opportunities for Negroes in 
occupations which have traditionally been closed to them.' " (quoting Sen. Humphrey, 110 
CoNG. REC. 6548 (1964)). 
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This Note analyzes the "manifest imbalance" sta~dard developed 
in Weber and Johnson and the various approaches the lower courts 
have taken in trying to apply the test. Part I examines the Weber and 
Johnson opinions in some detail, and argues that the Court intended to 
permit affirmative action aimed at remedying the evident effects of 
past discrimination, regardless of whether the employer or society at 
large is to blame. Section I.A describes the diverging constitutional 
and statutory standards for evaluating voluntary affirmative action 
programs, and the policies behind the divergence. Sections I.B and 
I.C take a closer look at the opinions in Weber and Johnson and Sec-
tion I.D concludes that the Court has developed a Title VII standard 
that permits affirmative action aimed at remedying the lingering effects 
of societal discrimination. Part II focuses on the specific statistical 
formulation prescribed by Johnson for determining the existence of a 
"manifest imbalance" in an employer's work force. It traces the com-
ponents of the Johnson test back to their roots in earlier Title VII ju-
risprudence, in which the test was used to detect illegal discrimination 
by a particular employer. Part III considers how the Johnson "mani-
fest imbalance" test has worked in practice. It describes the varying 
and sometimes conflicting approaches taken by the lower courts in 
searching for the appropriate statistical work force comparisons, and 
suggests that Johnson's two-track test forces courts to undertake hair-
splitting analyses of job qualifications and labor pools without giving 
them the criteria by which to make the necessary assessments. Fi-
nally, Part IV argues that the distinctions between skilled and un-
skilled job categories drawn by Johnson's two-track statistical test are 
unnecessary and, in fact, undesirable. The Note concludes by propos-
ing a unified standard by which an employer's work force would, in all 
cases, be compared to the local general labor market to determine 
whether the requisite "manifest imbalance" exists. This section argues 
that such a unified standard is designed to reveal the continued impact 
of past societal discrimination, rather than evaluate a particular em-
ployer's culpability, and is therefore more consistent with Title VII's 
broad allowance for voluntary remedial measures, emphasized by the 
Court in Johnson and Weber. The unified test would also enable 
courts to sidestep most of the vexing questions of work force and labor 
pool analysis now required by Johnson and presented in Part III. 
I. "MANIFEST IMBALANCE" UNDER WEBER AND JOHNSON 
All courts agree that voluntary affirmative action in any employ-
ment context must be remedial. 19 The disagreement typically con-
19. But see Note, supra note 8 (arguing that Weber and Johnson can be read to allow volun-
tary affirmative action based on nonremedial business objectives). Whatever virtues there might 
be to wholly nonremedial affirmative action in employment, it is clear that the courts have moved 
beyond this point in the debate and that the remedial purpose requirement is now settled. See, 
e.g., Johnson, 480 U.S. at 632 ("The requirement that the 'manifest imbalance' relate to a 'tradi-
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cerns whether, for purposes of Title VII, the required predicate of 
discrimination can be satisfied without employer guilt. Although the 
freedom of public employers to remedy societal discrimination 
through affirmative action seems increasingly constrained by the four-
teenth amendment, the freedom of private employers to do so under 
Title VII seems increasingly certain. A close look at the Court's opin-
ions in Weber and Johnson suggests that, regardless of the Constitu-
tion's constraints upon public employers, Title VII permits an 
employer to adopt affirmative action targeted at remedying society's 
discrimination rather than its own unlawful practices. 
A. Diverging Statutory and Constitutional Standards 
After Johnson, there can be no doubt that the standards for evalu-
ating voluntary affirmative action programs are different under Title 
VII and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. To 
survive constitutional scrutiny, an affirmative action plan adopted vol-
untarily by a public employer must be designed to remedy past dis-
crimination traceable in some way to the employer itself.20 A desire to 
tionally segregated job category' provides assurance both that sex or race will be taken into 
account in a manner consistent with Title VIl's purpose of eliminating the effects of employment 
discrimination ...• ") (emphasis added); 480 U.S. at 650 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) 
("[T]he employer must point to evidence sufficient to establish a firm basis for believing that 
remedial action is required .•.• ") (emphasis added); Ledoux v. District of Colum., 820 F.2d 
1293, 1299 (D.C. Cir.) ("Under [the Weber Court's] framework, a court must answer the follow-
ing two questions: first, was adoption of the plan justified as a remedial measure, and, second, 
does the plan unnecessarily trammel the legitimate interests of nonminority employees.") (em-
phasis added), rehg. granted, 833 F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1987), vacated, 841 F.2d 400 (D.C. Cir. 
1988); Hammon v. Barry, 826 F.2d 73, 74, 80-81 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("[A] predicate of discrimina-
tion is required before an employer may lawfully employ a race-conscious hiring [plan]."), cert. 
denied, 108 S. Ct. 2023 (1988). 
It is possible, of course, to be sympathetic to the concept of nonremedial affirmative action 
and yet to acknowledge that the courts have been decidedly less so. See Sullivan, Sins of Discrim-
ination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 78, 80 (1987) (advocating the 
merits of nonremedial affirmative action while conceding that "the Court has approved affirma-
tive action only as a precise penance for the specific sins of racism a government, union, or 
employer has committed in the past"). It is best to admit, however, as Professor Sullivan does, 
that allowing nonremedial affirmative action would entail a change in the law, not merely consis-
tent application of existing law. 
20. A majority of the Justices in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989), 
agreed that a public employer would have a sufficiently compelling interest in remedying either 
(1) the present effects of its own past discriminatory employment practices or (2) the present 
effects of private employment discrimination if the public employer's spending decisions had 
reinforced or perpetuated that private discrimination. See 109 S. Ct. at 719-20, 729 (plurality); 
109 S. Ct. at 734-35 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment); 109 S. Ct. at 743-44 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). Justice O'Connor suggested, for example, that even if the City of Richmond could 
not show that it had itself discriminated against black contractors in the awarding of contracts, it 
could still justify the use of affirmative action "if the city could show that it had essentially 
become a 'passive participant' [through its award of prime contracts] in a system of racial exclu-
sion practiced by elements of the local construction industry." 109 S. Ct. at 720. Justice 
cYConnor insisted that this allowance for a limited reach toward curing private discrimination 
exceeded the interpretation frequently given Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 
(1986), that would permit public affirmative action to remedy only direct governmental discrimi-
nation. See 109 S. Ct. at 717; see also Wygant, 416 U.S. at 269-84 (plurality opinion); Michigan 
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remedy the general effects of societal discrimination will almost cer-
tainly be found not to be a compelling governmental purpose sufficient 
to survive strict scrutiny.21 While the Court has been careful not to 
require a public employer actually to prove itself guilty of past consti-
tutional or statutory violations in order to employ affirmative action, it 
has required that the employer have a "firm basis" for believing there 
has been employment discrimination requiring remedy.22 
The majority in Johnson made clear that Title VII analysis is some-
thing quite different. The defendant in Johnson was a public em-
ployer, but the plaintiff in Johnson did not raise a constitutional 
challenge, alleging instead only that the affirmative action plan vio-
lated Title VII. 23 This enabled the Court to focus exclusively on the 
duties established by Title VII, setting aside what it held were the 
quite separate requirements of the fourteenth amendment. After con-
sidering Title VIl's legislative history, the Court held that the re-
straints placed by the statute upon an employer's freedom to adopt 
voluntarily an affirmative action plan fall short of those imposed by 
the Constitution: "The fact that a public employer must also satisfy 
the Constitution does not negate the fact that the statutory prohibition 
with which that employer must contend was not intended to extend as 
far as that of the Constitution."24 Just how far short the demands of 
Title VII fall is not entirely settled, but after Johnson at least one criti-
cal difference between the two standards seems clear: Title VII, unlike 
the fourteenth amendment, does not require an employer to suggest 
that it may itself be guilty of past discrimination in order to justify the 
Road Builders Assn. v. Milliken, 834 F.2d 583, 589-90 (6th Cir. 1987) {applying Wygant and 
reviewing other lower court interpretations requiring a predicate of past discrimination by the 
governmental unit itself), ajfd. per curiam, 109 S. Ct. 1333 (1989). 
21. See Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 724; Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274, 276 ("This Court has never held 
that societal discrimination alone is sufficient to justify a racial classification. Rather, the Court 
has insisted upon some showing of prior discrimination by the governmental unit involved before 
allowing limited use of racial classifications in order to remedy such discrimination."); 476 U.S. 
at 288 (O'Connor, J., concurring) {"I agree with the plurality that a governmental agency's inter-
est in remedying 'societal' discrimination, that is, discrimination not traceable to its own actions, 
cannot be deemed sufficiently compelling to pass constitutional muster under strict scrutiny."); 
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307, 310 (1978) (rejecting societal discrimina-
tion as an adequate factual predicate for voluntary affirmative action in the equal protection 
context); see also Jones, The Origins of Affirmative Action, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 383, 408 
(1988); Schwartz, supra note 7, at 553-61 (1987) (criticizing the Court's rejection of societal 
discrimination as an adequate predicate for affirmative action by public employers under equal 
protection analysis). 
22. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 286, 292 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("This remedial purpose 
need not be accompanied by contemporaneous findings of actual discrimination to be accepted as 
legitimate as long as the public actor has a firm basis for believing that remedial action is re-
quired."); 476 U.S. at 277 {opinion of Powell, J.) ("[T]he trial court must make a factual determi-
nation that the employer had a strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial action 
was necessary."); Johnson, 480 U.S. at 650-51 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
23. 480 U.S. at 620 n.2. 
24. 480 U.S. at 628 n.6 (emphasis in original). 
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use of affirmative action. Although there remain some dissenters,25 
the standards that have emerged from Johnson and Weber appear to 
hold that an employer is free to adopt race- or gender-conscious reme-
dies designed to undo harm lingering from a history of discrimination 
by society at large. 
The current standards for Title VII analysis of voluntary affirma-
tive action programs, including the allowance for extending their 
reach to remedy societal discrimination, are best understood by trac-
ing their development from their roots in Weber. 
B. Steelworkers v. Weber 
The controversy that eventually reached the Supreme Court in 
Weber originated at the Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation 
plant in Gramercy, Louisiana. The work force at the Gramercy plant, 
and fourteen other Kaiser facilities elsewhere, was overwhelmingly 
white. Although thirty-nine percent of the Gramercy area labor force 
was black at the time the affirmative action plan was adopted, Kaiser's 
Gramercy, plant work force at that time was less than two percent 
25. Justice O'Connor, for example, in her separate opinion concurring with the Court's judg· 
ment in Johnson, rejected the wedge driven by the Court between constitutional and statutory 
analysis and insisted that an employer's duty under Title VII is the same as under the fourteenth 
amendment: in each case, the employer may adopt affirmative action only if it has "a firm basis 
for believing that remedial action was required"; statistical disparities provide such a "firm basis" 
only if they are stark enough to make out a Title VII prima facie case of past discrimination by 
the employer. See 480 U.S. at 649 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). 
Her insistence that the employer have a "firm basis" for believing that it does have such legal 
obligations is designed to ensure that affirmative action is not used by an employer that has never 
discriminated but which desires to ameliorate the effects of societal discrimination reflected in its 
work force. "Evidence sufficient for a prlma facie Title VII [case] against the employer itself," 
she wrote in Johnson, "suggests that the absence of women or minorities in a work force cannot 
be explained by general societal discrimination alone and that remedial action is appropriate." 
480 U.S. at 653 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Earlier, in her Wygant opinion, she 
had explained her view in criticizing the lower court rulings upholding the Jackson school 
board's affirmative action plan: 
The courts below ruled that a particularized, contemporaneous finding of discrimination 
was not necessary and upheld the plan as a remedy for "societal" discrimination, apparently 
on the assumption that in the absence of a specific, contemporaneous finding, any discrimi· 
nation addressed by an affirmative action plan could only be termed "societal." I believe 
that this assumption is false ..•• 
476 U.S. at 289 (citation omitted). Thus, Justice O'Connor would allow voluntary affirmative 
action only where (1) there exists a formal finding that the employer has engaged in past illegal 
discrimination, or (2) past illegal discrimination by the employer is reasonably suspected, 
although not yet officially proven. This allowance does not seem well calculated to encourage 
voluntary employer action since it still would apparently require an employer to produce, at the 
least, evidence sufficient or nearly sufficient to establish a prima facie Title VII case against itself. 
Justice O'Connor's approach was also clearly rejected by the majority in Johnson. 480 U.S. at 
632-33. 
Besides Justice O'Connor, another dissenter is former Judge Starr of the Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit. Evaluating a voluntary affirmative action plan after Johnson, 
Judge Starr found support in Johnson for the circuit court's earlier holding that "a predicate of 
discrimination is required before an employer may lawfully employ a race-conscious remedial 
device." Hammon v. Barry, 826 F.2d 73, 80-81 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2023 
(1988). 
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black.26 Yet this disparity was not attributed to discrimination by 
Kaiser,27 but rather to the historical exclusion of blacks from the craft 
unions from which Kaiser hired its employees.28 Until 1974, Kaiser's 
policy was to hire only employees with prior craft experience; since the 
unions discriminated against blacks, few blacks were able to gain the 
experience required by Kaiser. Fearing a possible lawsuit by black 
employees alleging discrimination and under pressure from the Office 
of Federal Contract Compliance, 29 Kaiser decided to change its policy 
and to train more black workers itself. In February 1974, Kaiser and 
the United Steelworkers union agreed to institute a program to train 
new craftworkers and to train one black worker for every white 
worker admitted to the program. Brian Weber, a white employee 
hired six years earlier, was denied a spot in the training program and 
brought suit under Title VII. 30 
The Fifth Circuit sustained Weber's challenge and held that the 
training program's racial preferences violated Title VII because they 
were not founded upon a finding of past discrimination by Kaiser.31 
Kaiser was not free, the court held, to employ affirmative action· to 
remedy past societal discrimination, only its own.32 Judge Wisdom 
dissented to the ·Fifth Circuit's conclusion and argued that it was un-
realistic to require an employer to convict itself of past illegal discrimi-
nation before allowing it to adopt voluntary remedial measures. Such 
a requirement would force employers to expose themselves to liability 
under Title VII to minority or female employees and would be a pow-
26. 443 U.S. at 198-99. 
27. According to the fact findings of the lower courts - findings that were not disturbed by 
the Supreme Court - Kaiser itself was never guilty of any discriminatory practice since it 
opened its Gramercy plant in 1958. See 563 F.2d 216, 224 (5th Cir. 1977), revd. sub nom. United 
Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). Judge Wisdom, in his dissent, averred 
that this finding was "highly questionable," see 563 F.2d at 229 n.7 (Wisdom, J., dissenting), but 
all legal analysis of the affirmative action plan was based upon the assumption that Kaiser itself 
had never discriminated. Judge Wisdom suggested that "[i]n spite of the district court's finding 
that the defendants had not discriminated against blacks at Gramercy, there were arguable viola-
tions" sufficient to justify voluntary affirmative· action under his proposed "arguable violation" 
standard. 563 F.2d at 231 (Wisdom, J., dissenting). 
28. See 443 U.S. at 198; see also 443 U.S. at 212 n.* {Blackmun, J., concurring). 
29. Kaiser had sought to justify its affirmative action program on the alternative ground that 
its prior conduct amounted to an "arguable violation" of Title VII's prohibition of racial discrim-
ination. But because the Weber majority held that Title VII does not require an employer to 
show an actual or "arguable" violation of its own, but merely to point to a "conspicuous racial 
imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories," the Court found it unnecessary to consider 
Kaiser's argument. 443 U.S. at 209 n.9 and accompanying text; see also 443 U.S. at 208 n.8 
("This is not to suggest that the freedom of an employer to undertake race-conscious affirmative 
action efforts depends on whether or not his effort is motivated by fear of liability under Title 
VII."). . 
As for the pressure Kaiser felt to institute affirmative action, see 443 U.S. at 222-23 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting); 563 F.2d at 228-29 (Wisdom, J., dissenting). 
30. 443 U.S. at 199. 
31. See 563 F.2d at 225. 
32. 563 F.2d at 224-25. 
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erful disincentive to voluntary efforts to achieve the driving aim of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964: the integration of blacks into the economic 
mainstream.33 Judge Wisdom urged instead the use of an "arguable 
violation" standard, requiring an employer to show only that a viola-
tion of Title VII may have occurred in the past without requiring that 
the employer actually produce evidence sufficient to prove a 
violation. 34 
Judge Wisdom also offered an alternative ground upon which to 
uphold the Kaiser plan: remedying societal discrimination.35 He ac-
knowledged that such a "societal discrimination justification" for vol-
untary affirmative action was somewhat novel, but found that it served 
the policy of Title VII. 36 He concluded: 
[I]n spite of our newly adopted equality, the pervasive effects of centuries 
of societal discrimination still haunt us. Kaiser and the United Steel-
workers sought in a reasonable manner to remedy some of those effects 
in employment practices. Their actions may or may not be just to all its 
employees; they may or may not be wise; but I believe they are legal.37 
The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit and also declined to 
adopt Judge Wisdom's more flexible "arguable violation" standard. 
Instead, in upholding the Kaiser affirmative action plan, it adopted a 
test more liberal than the "arguable violation" standard Judge Wis-
dom proposed and much closer, if not identical, to the "societal dis-
crimination" predicate he had alternatively suggested.38 The Court 
reviewed Title VIl's legislative history and concluded that Congress 
intended the statute to serve as a broad remedial tool for tearing down 
social and economic barriers that were keeping many blacks poor and 
unemployed. "Congress' primary concern," the Court wrote, "in en-
acting the prohibition against racial discrimination in Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 was with 'the plight of the Negro in our 
economy.' "39 The Court found that Congress had aimed especially to 
encourage voluntary private efforts "to eliminate, so far as possible, 
the last vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious page in this coun-
try's history.''40 It stated: 
It would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation's concern over 
centuries of racial injustice and intended to improve the lot of those who 
33. See 563 F.2d at 230-31 (Wisdom, J., dissenting). 
34. See 563 F.2d at 230-34 (Wisdom, J., dissenting). 
35. 563 F.2d at 234 (Wisdom, J., dissenting). 
36. See 563 F.2d at 235-36 (Wisdom, J., dissenting). 
37. 563 F.2d at 239 (Wisdom, J., dissenting). 
38. Justice Blackmun, for instance, in his concurring opinion in Weber was inclined to em-
brace Judge Wisdom's "arguable violation" test. He wrote, however, that he was persuaded to 
go along with the majority's more "expansive" allowance for voluntary affirmative action, one 
that "sweep[s] far more broadly than the class of'arguable violations' of Title VII." See 443 U.S. 
at 211-13 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
39. 443 U.S. at 202 (quoting remarks of Sen. Humphrey, 110 CONG. REC. 6548 (1964)). 
40. 443 U.S. at 204 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975)). 
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had "been excluded from the American dream for so long," constituted 
the first legislative prohibition of all voluntary, private, race-conscious 
efforts to abolish traditional patterns of racial segregation and 
hierarchy.41 
The Court's emphasis on "centuries of racial injustice" and "tradi-
tional patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy" suggests that it 
was looking beyond merely isolated and discrete instances of illegal 
discrimination by particular employers. The "societal discrimination" 
which the Court rejected· as a basis for affirmative action under its 
constitutional standards42 looms large as an apparently acceptable ba-
sis for the affirmative action in Weber. The Weber Court noted that 
Title VII did not require employers to address "de facto raciaUmbal-
ance[s]," but neither did it forbid them from doing so.43 It is signifi-
cant that the Court chose to speak in terms of "de facto imbalance" -
a term that implies something broader than only imbalances created 
by identifiable instances of illegal discrimination on the part of em-
ployers. Clearly, Justice Blackmun took the Weber majority to mean 
that any predicate of discrimination by the employer had been aban-
doned under Title VII analysis. He noted in his concurring opinion 
that Weber "measures an individual employer's capacity for affirma-
tive action solely in terms of a statistical disparity. The individual em-
ployer need not have engaged in discriminatory practices in the 
past."44 
41. 443 U.S. at 204 (citation omitted). 
42. See supra note 21. 
43. 443 U.S. at 205-06. 
44. 443 U.S. at 213 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Stevens reached a similar conclusion 
about Weber: "If Title VII had never been enacted, a private employer would be free to hire 
members of minority groups for any reason that might seem sensible from a business or social 
point of view. The Court's opinion in Weber reflects the same approach." Johnson, 480 U.S. at 
645 (Stevens, J., concurring). But see 480 U.S. at 649 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) 
(criticizing Justice Stevens' characterization of Weber). 
See also Tangren v. Wackenhut Servs., Inc., 658 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1981) (Title VII does not 
prohibit an employer with no history of race discrimination from employing voluntary affirma-
tive action to correct de facto racial imbalances in its work force); Cohen v. Community College 
of Philadelphia, 484 F. Supp. 411, 434 (E.D. Pa. 1980) ("[U]nder Weber, an employer's affirma-
tive action plan can be justified by the existence of a history of racial discrimination in the rele-
vant occupation or profession at large," even where the employer itself has never discriminated.). 
See generally Cohen, Voluntary Affirmative Action After Weber, 34 LABOR L.J. 138 (1983) (re-
viewing lower court interpretations of the remedial purpose requirement set out in Weber); Kreil-
ing & Mercurio, Beyond Weber: The Broadening Scope of Judicial Approval of Affirmative 
Action, 88 DICK. L. REV. 46 (1983) (same). 
Some observers off the bench also read Weber to allow voluntary affirmative action even 
when the employer has never itself discriminated. Weber, one wrote, "encourag[es] employers to 
voluntarily adopt affirmative action programs ... for whatever purposes: ... [including] a good 
faith effort to remedy the effects of societal discrimination." D. BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND 
AMERICAN LAW 651 (1980). . 
See also Boyd, Affirmative Action in Employment - The Weber Decision, 66 Iow AL. REV. 1, 
10-18 (1980) (exploring the Weber majority's use of the phrase "traditionally segregated job cate-
gories" and urging a broad reading allowing affirmative action aimed at remedying societal dis-
crimination); Allegretti, Voluntary Racial Goals After Weber: How High Is Too High?, 17 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 773, 789-91 (1984) (accepting Professor Boyd's interpretation of "tradition-
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C. · Johnson v. Transportation Agency 
In Johnson, the Court upheld an affirmative action plan voluntarily 
adopted by a California county government against a Title VII chal-
lenge brought by a white male employee. Santa Clara County had 
adopted the plan in December 1978, for the hiring and promotion of 
women and minorities. The plan was designed to erase a statistical 
underrepresentation of women in nonclerical positions and blacks in 
management positions.45 The plan was upheld by the Court even 
though the gender disparity was expressly attributed not to sex dis-
crimination by the County but to a social history that discouraged 
female entry into the male-dominated road crew and dispatcher posi-
tions at stake.46 
When Johnson came before the Court, eight years had passed since 
Kaiser's affirmative action plan had been upheld in Weber. In the in-
ally segregated job categories"); Kreiling & Mercurio, supra, at 64 ("Weber suggests that the 
employer should be allowed considerable latitude in remedying discrimination upon a demon· 
stration of societal discrimination in the relevant labor market and reflection of that societal 
discrimination in its work force."); Note, Bakke and Weber: The Concept of Societal Discrimina-
tion, 11 LoY. U. Ciu. L.J. 297, 323 (1980) ("Societal discrimination was found in Weber to be a 
sufficient basis to justify a racially preferential program."). But see Morris, New Light on Racial 
Affirmative Action, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 219, 250 (1987) (Weber, reinterpreted in the light of 
dictum from Local 93, Intl. Assn. of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 {1986), 
"indicates that an employer must demonstrate a factual predicate 'concerning prior discrimina· 
tion on its part against minorities.' "). 
Another author has gone even farther, calling the Weber majority's formulation a "societal 
discrimination approach" that contains a certain "schizophrenia" by limiting employers from 
fully attacking societal discrimination. Why, Professor Schatzki asked, should the Court permit 
employers to correct voluntarily de facto racial imbalances in their own work forces while 
preventing them from deliberately hiring a disproportionately high number of minorities in order 
to mitigate societal discrimination in the nation's work force? Schatzki, United Steelworkers of 
America v. Weber: An Exercise in Understandable Indecision, 56 WASH. L. REV. 51, 53, 68-69 
(1980). The Court, however, would be almost certain to invalidate an affirmative action plan that 
favored minorities or women beyond their representation in the population. Such disproportion· 
ate preferences would very likely be found to "unnecessarily trammel" the rights of majority 
employees, the second prong of the Johnson test, see supra note 11, by constricting so sharply 
their ability to compete for job openings and promotions. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 640 (noting 
the virtues of the affirmative action plan's "moderate, gradual approach to eliminating the imbal· 
ance in [the employer's] work force, one .•. which visits minimal intrusion upon the legitimate 
expectations of other employees"); see also Allegretti, supra at 791-92 (rebutting Professor 
Schatzki's argument). 
45. 480 U.S. at 621. Although women constituted 36.4% of the Santa Clara area labor mar-
ket, they made up only 22.4% of the County Transportation Agency's employees, and those 
women were heavily concentrated in "EEOC job categories traditionally held by women." The 
plan's minority hiring and promotion goals were similarly justified by an overconcentration of 
blacks in lower-level job categories. "[W)hile the proportion of ethnic minorities in the Agency 
as a whole exceeds the proportion of such minorities in the county work force, a smaller percent· 
age of minority employees held management, professional, and technical positions.'' 480 U.S. at 
621. Minorities constituted 19.7% of the county labor market, but only 7.1% of the Agency's 
officials and administrators. Nineteen percent of the Agency's professionals were minorities, as 
were 16.9% of its technicians. 480 U.S. at 621 n.4. 
46. 480 U.S. at 621, 634 n.12; see also 480 U.S. at 668 (Scalia, J., dissenting); D. McDow-
ELL, supra note 17, at 43 ("No past discrimination against women was admitted, alleged, or 
proven" in Johnson.). 
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terim, the Court had struck down voluntary affirmative action by 
public employers grounded in "societal discrimination" as unconstitu-
tional in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education. 47 Its consideration of 
Johnson the following Term thus provided the opportunity to apply 
the same rules in Title VII analysis. The Court, however, declined the 
invitation. Instead it rejected the application of constitutional doc-
trines to Title VII analysis48 and elaborated on the broader Title VII 
allowances it had begun to construct in Weber. The majority in John-
son emphasized again the "crucial role" played by voluntary employer 
action in achieving Title VII's broad remedial aims and appeared .to 
approve of Justice Blackmun's earlier reading of Weber: 
As Justice BLACKMUN's concurrence made clear, Weber held that an 
employer seeking to justify the adoption of a plan need not point to its 
own prior discriminatory practices, nor even to evidence of an "arguable 
violation" on its part. Rather, it need point only to a "conspicuous .... 
imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories."49 
Furthermore, the Court wrote, "JUSTICE ScALIA's suggestion that 
an affirmative action program may be adopted only to redress an 
employer's past discrimination was rejected in Steelworkers v. 
Weber .... " 50 Instead, voluntary affirmative action will be upheld 
under Title VII so long as it is ·~ustified by the existence of a 'manifest 
imbalance' that reflect[s] underrepresentation of women [or minori-
ties] in 'traditionally segregated job categories.' "Sl 
D. Societal Discrimination as a Predicate for Voluntary Affirmative 
Action Under Title VII 
Johnson established clearly that an employer need not suggest that 
it is guilty of past illegal discrimination in order to employ voluntary 
affirmative remedies. Johnson did not, however, explicitly hold that an 
employer could still use affirmative action if it were proven never to 
have discriminated. In an examination of the Supreme Court's recent 
affirmative action cases, Judge Edwards of the Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit wrote, "Indeed, a comparison of 
Johnson and Wygant reveals that the critical distinction lies in the 
quantum of evidence needed to demonstrate that the plan was adopted 
for a remedial purpose.''52 That is certainly true, but the crucial ques-
47. 476 U.S. 267 (1986) {plurality holding unconstitutional city's collective bargaining agree-
ment provision granting limited preference to minority teachers in layoff decisions). 
48. See 480 U.S. at 627 n.6. 
49. 480 U.S. at 630 (citation omitted). 
50. 480 U.S. at 630 n.8 (citation omitted). 
51. 480 U.S. at 631. The employer must also be able to demonstrate that the plan satisfies 
the second prong of the Johnson-Weber test, i.e., that it does not "unnecessarily trammel" the 
interests of majority employees. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 630-31; see also supra note 11. 
52. Edwards, The Future of Affirmative Action in Employment, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 
763, 777 (1987) (emphasis in original). 
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tion is, why did the Court demand a smaller quantum of evidence in 
Title VII cases? Did it adopt the more lenient standard because it 
acknowledged the permissibility of a different sort of remedial purpose 
under Title VII -i.e., curing societal discrimination? Or, did it adopt 
the lesser standard merely to strike a compromise with employers who 
feared establishing their liability to minority or women employees, al-
lowing them to remedy their own past discrimination without having 
to admit what they were doing?53 
The Johnson Court itself did not give a definitive answer, holding 
only that a sufficient predicate for affirmative action would be made 
out wherever there existed "a 'manifest imbalance' ... in 'traditionally 
segregated job categories.' " 54 Exactly what the Court meant by the 
phrase "traditionally segregated" has been disputed since it was first 
used in Weber. Some judges have taken it to mean a long-standing 
pattern of discrimination by the employer. 55 These judges, therefore, 
will permit voluntary affirmative action only upon a sufficient showing 
that the employer seeking to adopt the remedy has itself created the 
segregation through discriminatory practices. 56 This narrow reading 
of the Court's language is contrasted with an interpretation that takes 
"traditionally segregated job categories" to mean occupations in 
which there is generally a history of widespread discrimination.57 This 
broader view would permit, for example, an employer of unionized 
skilled labor whose work force was overwhelmingly white and male, to 
adopt voluntarily an affirmative action plan for the hiring of minorities 
and women even if the employer had never itself discriminated. Since 
the Court has already accepted as obvious the history of discrimina-
tion in the craft unions, 58 the employer would only have to show the 
manifest imbalance in its work force. In fact, this was essentially the 
situation in Weber. 59 
53. This latter view is essentially the tack taken by Justice O'Connor in her "firm basis" 
approach, rejected by the majority in Johnson. See supra note 25. 
54. 480 U.S. at 631. 
55. Proponents of this narrow interpretation include Justices Scalia, see infra note 64 and 
accompanying text, and White, see infra note 66 and accompanying text. 
56. See Hammon v. Barry, 826 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2023 (1988); 
Johnson, 770 F.2d,752, 764 (9th Cir. 1984) (Wallace, J., dissenting in part) ("[T]he employer 
must be able to point to past or present discriminatory patterns and practices that created the 
traditional segregation of the job categories in question."), ajfd., 480 U.S. 616 (1987). 
57. This reading seems consistent with the purpose of Title VII, as interpreted by the Weber 
Court. There, the Court wrote: "The purposes of the [Kaiser] plan mirror those of the statute. 
. . . Both were structured to 'open employment opportunities for Negroes in occupations which 
have been traditionally closed to them.' " 443 U.S. at 208 (quoting remarks of Sen. Humphrey, 
110 CONG. REC. 6548 (1964)). 
58. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 198 n.l ("Judicial findings of exclusion from crafts on racial 
grounds are so numerous as to make such exclusion a proper subject for judicial notice.''). 
59. The only way in which Weber might be distinguished from this fact situation is by argu-
ing that in Weber, although Kaiser had not been shown guilty of past discrimination, neither had 
it been conclusively vindicated. By this view, Weber's allowance for affirmative action would 
extend only to this nether world of doubt over the employer's past conduct; if it could be proven 
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There is substantial evidence that the Court intended the phrase 
"traditionally segregated" to reach societal discrimination as well as 
identifiable employer acts. 60 One of the most striking indiqations is 
that the Court did not look to identifiable employer acts or policies in 
either Weber or Johnson. 6 1 
Further support for this broad reading is found in Johnson's his-
tory in the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. There, Judge Wal-
lace wrote a pointed dissent to the majority's holding that Santa 
Clara's plan was justified by a showing of a stark gender imbalance 
alone: 
By using the term "traditionally segregated job categories," the [Weber] 
Court incorporated a requirement that a showing Of past discrimination 
must be made .... [T]o the extent that the majority opinion holds that a 
11?-ere statistical disparity suffices to show that a job category was "tradi-
tionally segregated," it is contrary to both Weber and Janowiak. ... 
[T]he ratio alone is insufficient to show a pattern of traditional sex-based 
segregation. 62 
The Supreme Court, however, affirmed the majority's interpretation. 
In his concurring opinion to Weber, Justice Blackmun joined the issue 
and tried to explain the Court's phraseology. The Court's opinion in 
Weber, he wrote, "permits affirmative action by an employer whenever 
the job category in question is 'traditionally segregated.' The sources 
cited suggest that the Court considers a job category to be 'tradition-
ally segregated' when there has been a societal history of purposeful 
exclusion of blacks from the job category .... "63 
Finally, the conclusion that the Court in Johnson interpreted Title 
VII to allow voluntary affirmative action aimed solely at societal dis-
crimination is also reinforced by the views taken by the Johnson dis-
senters. Justice Scalia bristled at the wedge driven by the majority 
between constitutional and statutory analysis and argued that the ma-
(for example, as with a newly established employer) that the employer had never engaged in 
illegal discrimination, then affirmative action would be forbidden. (This is apparently Justice 
O'Connor's view, see supra note 25.) 
Yet this distinction is not persuasive because, whatever the actual history of Kaiser's employ-
ment practices, the courts treated Kaiser as if it had never discriminated. See supra note 27. 
60. A number of courts and commentators, writing both before and after Johnson and inter-
preting the "traditionally segregated job categories" phrase, have reached this conclusion. See 
supra note 44; Buchanan, Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County: A Paradigm 
of AffirmatiVe Action, 26 Hous. L. REV. 229, 262-65 (1989) (urging that Johnson and Weber be 
read to permit voluntary affirmative action that "advances the goal of 'remedying the effects of 
past societal discrimination' .... "); Selig, Affirmative Action in Employmem: The Legacy of a 
Supreme Court Majority, 63 IND. L.J. 301, 341 (1987) (reviewing the Court's holding in Johnson 
and concluding: "In other words, 'societal discrimination' can be a sufficient justification for 
voluntary affirmative action so far as Title VII is concerned, even though it probably would not 
be a sufficient justification under the fourteenth amendment."). 
61. See supra notes 27 and 46. 
62. 770 F.2d at 764 n.l (Wallace, J., dissenting in part) (citations omitted; emphasis in 
original). 
63. 443 U.S. at 212 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citations 01t1itted; emphasis added). · 
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jority's op1mon in Johnson contradicted the plurality's holding in 
Wygant: 
The most significant proposition of law established by today's deci-
sion is that racial or sexual discrimination is permitted under Title VII 
when it is intended to overcome the effect, not of the employer's own 
discrimination, but of societal attitudes that have limited the entry of 
certain races, or of a particular sex, into certain jobs . 
. . . The majority often uses the phrase "traditionally segregated job 
category" to describe the evil against which the plan is legitimately (ac-
cording to the majority) directed. As originally used in Steelworkers v. 
Weber, that phrase described skilled jobs from which employers and un-
ions had systematically and intentionally excluded black workers - tra-
ditionally segregated jobs, that is, in the sense of conscious, exclusionary 
discrimination. But that is assuredly not the sense in which the phrase is 
used here. . . . [The job at stake in Johnson] is a "traditionally segregated 
job category" not in the Weber sense, but in the sense that, because of 
longstanding social attitudes, it has not been regarded by women them-
selves as desirable work. 64 
Scalia concluded by arguing that Weber itself should be overruled65 
and that the Court should return to an earlier view of Title VII as a 
barrier to affirmative action based merely upon the lingering effects of 
past societal discrimination. Justice White agreed, and made equally 
clear that Johnson had rejected the narrow reading of the "tradition-
ally segregated" phrase: 
... I also would overrule Weber. My understanding of Weber was, and 
is, that the employer's plan did not violate Title VII because it was 
designed to remedy intentional and systematic exclusion of blacks by the 
employer and the unions from certain job categories. That is how I un-
derstood the phrase "traditionally segregated jobs" that we used in that 
case. The Court now interprets it to mean nothing more than a manifest 
imbalance between one identifiable group and another in an employer's 
labor force. 66 
The majority opinion in Johnson took issue with several observations 
made by the dissenters and by Justice O'Connor in her separate opin-
ion concurring in the judgment. 67 While it is by no means conclusive, 
64. 480 U.S. at 664, 667-68 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). For a rejoinder to 
the argument that discrimination cannot exist if women themselves "choose" to work in female· 
dominated job categories, see Williams, supra note 5, at 822-36 (arguing that such "choices" 
merely reflect the pervasive success of systemic discrimination in encouraging women to internal· 
ize sex-role stereotypes). 
65. 480 U.S. at 673 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
66. 480 U.S. at 657 (White, J., dissenting). 
67. See, e.g., 480 U.S. at 627 n.6 (disputing Justice Scalia's equation of statutory nnd consti-
tutional analysis); at 629 n.7 (defending against attack by Justice Scalia the probative value of 
congressional failure to modify the Court's decision in Weber); at 630 n.8 (disputing the dissent's 
suggestion that voluntary affirmative action must be aimed at redressing an employer's past dis-
crimination and the dissent's assertion that employers should be able to accomplish no more 
through voluntary affirmative action than courts can achieve through compulsory remedies); nt 
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it is nonetheless interesting to note that the majority qid not dispute 
the characterizations of its holding offered by Justices Scalia or White 
regarding the phrase "traditionally segregated" jobs. 
II. THE ROOTS OF JOHNSON'S STATISTICAL TEST 
Having established that an employer may rely upon a statistical 
imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories as a sufficient 
predicate for adopting an affirmative action plan, the Court in Johnson 
went on to offer some direction to future courts about just how to 
determine whether an employer has shown the requisite "manifest im-
balance." In doing so, it simply borrowed the statistical formulation 
that had been developed in Title VII's earlier case law, even though 
that test had been designed for a very different purpose: to detect un-
lawful discrimination by the employer whose work force was being 
scrutinized. The Court's application of this test in Johnson to the vol-
untary affirmative action setting has caused two significant problems: 
first, it has needlessly restricted the permissible scope of voluntary af-
firmative action in contravention of the Court's own insistence that an 
employer need not show its own discrimination before employing race-
or gender-conscious remedies; second, it forces courts to wade deeply 
into the morass of complex work force and labor pool analysis that has 
proved so difficult in earlier Title VII jurisprudence. 68 This Part 
traces the origins of Johnson's statistical test back to those early dis-
crimination cases. 
In Johnson, the Court set up a two-track test. If an affirmative 
action plan applies to unskilled jobs or entry-level training programs, 
courts are to compare the employer's work force with either the local 
general population or the local area labor market. If, however, the 
program applies to skilled jobs, courts are to compare the employer's 
work force to the smaller pool of persons in the area labor market who 
possess the special skills required for the job. 69 Despite this relatively 
straightforward instruction, several lower courts faced with Title VII 
challenges to affirmative action plans have disagreed about how to ap-
ply Johnson's "manifest imbalance" test. Several have reached oppo-
site conclusions about whether the proper comparison for a given job 
category is to the general labor market or to a specialized pool, and 
others have differed over whether the comparative pool should be con-
fined to the city limits within which the employer is located or should 
632 (refuting Justice O'Connor's assertion that the "manifest imbalance" that employers must 
show need be stark enough to support a prima facie case for a Title VII action against the 
employer); and at 641 n.17 (disputing the dissent's argument that too great an allowance for 
voluntary affirmative action "will loose a flood of 'less qualified' minorities and women upon the 
work force"). 
68. See infra Part III. 
69. 480 U.S. at 631-32. 
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extend outward to encompass neighboring suburbs. 70 Since the racial 
composition of these different pools may vary significantly, 71 the 
choice may well determine whether a "manifest imbalance" appears 
and, therefore, whether voluntary affirmative action is permissible. 
Of course, neither Johnson nor Weber was the first Title VII case 
to make central use of statistical analysis of an employer's work force. 
Before Weber, however, statistics were typically not used as an em-
ployer's shield, to justify the voluntary undertaking of race-conscious 
remedies, but rather as a plaintiff's sword, to prove the employer's 
practice of unlawful discrimination. Statistical evidence was first em-
ployed in Title VII's original context - minority plaintiffs suing em-
ployers based on employer conduct that was alleged to discriminate 
against minorities; This context might be labeled one of "direct" (as 
opposed to "reverse") discrimination. To prevail in a Title VII case 
alleging direct discrimination, a plaintiff must prove either that the 
employer-defendant has intentionally discriminated against protected 
employees or that it has engaged in practices that have an unjustifiable 
disproportionate impact on a racial or gender class. 72 
A claim of discrimination under Title VII may be substantiated by 
statistical data concerning the employer's work force. 73 The useful-
ness of statistical data is apparent. If, as an extreme example, seventy-
five percent of doctors in a given local area are black, but the area's 
largest employer of doctors has never hired a black in its 100-year 
history, those statistics would likely support a very reasonable infer-
ence that the employer has discriminated against blacks, even in the 
absence of other evidence regarding the employer's intentions. The 
Supreme Court recognized the probative value of statistical analysis of 
an employer's work force in Title VII suits as early as 1977 in Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States. 74 And it is from 
Teamsters and subsequent direct discrimination cases that the Johnson 
manifest imbalance test arose. To understand the mechanics of the 
Johnson test in the affirmative action context, it is therefore important 
to trace its components back to their roots in the direct discrimination 
suits. The Court's rulings in those earlier cases shed valuable light on 
how to construct the proper statistical comparison; they also help to 
70. See generally infra Part III. 
71. While it is less likely that the gender compositions of these different reference pools will 
vary so widely, in some cases the variations may nonetheless be sufficient to determine whether a 
"manifest imbalance" exists. 
72. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 57 U.S.L.W. 4583 (1989) (reviewing alter· 
native Title VII theor_ies of disparate-treatment and disparate-impact discrimination). 
73. See, e.g .• D. BALDUS & J. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION (1980 & 
Supp. 1987); Corbett, Proving and Defending Employment Discrimination Claims, 47 MONT, L. 
REV. 217 (1986). 
74. 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (finding discrimination by Teamsters in violation of Title VII based 
in part on gross underrepresentation of minorities in defendant's truck-driver ranks). 
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point out ultimately why the statistical comparisons that were appro-
priate in revealing direct discrimination are inappropriate in determin-
ing whether Title VII permits an employer to adopt voluntary 
affirmative action. 1s 
In Teamsters, the Court explained the value of statistics in the di-
rect discrimination context: 
[A]bsent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscrimi-
natory hiring practices will in time result in a work force more or less 
representative of the racial and ethnic composition of the population in 
the community from which employees are hired. Evidence of long-last-
ing and gross disparity between the composition of the work force and 
that of the general population thus may be significant [in showing dis-
crimination in violation of Title VII]. 76 
Only one month later, the Court refined the recommended comparison 
in another Title VII action alleging employer discrimination against 
minorities. In Hazelwood School District v. United States, 77 the Court 
accepted the suggestion of the court of appeals below that, in cases 
involving skilled job categories, the proper comparison should be be-
tween the employer's work force and only that pool of the local labor 
market qualified for the job, not, as Teamsters had suggested, the local 
general population. Thus, to infer whether or not the defendant, a 
suburban St. Louis school district, had discnminated in the hiring of 
teachers, the Court held that the "proper comparison was between the 
racial composition of Hazelwood's teaching staff and the racial com-
position of the qualified public school teacher population in the rele-
vant labor market."78 The Court explained its modification of the 
Teamsters rule: 
In Teamsters, the comparison between the percentage of Negroes on 
the employer's work force and the percentage in the general area-wide 
population was highly probative, because the job skill there involved -
the ability to drive a truck - is one that many persons possess or can 
fairly readily acquire. When special qualifications are required to fill 
particular jobs, comparisons to the general population (rather than to 
the smaller group of individuals who possess the necessary qualifica-
tions) maY: have little probative value.79 
This is because societal discrimination may cause "long-lasting and 
gross [statistical] disparity"' between an employer's skilled work force 
and the racial composition of the area's general population despite the 
employer's nondiscriminatory conduct. A simple· hypothetical illus-
trates the soundness of the Court's approach. Suppose that because of 
a long history of discrimination in a given community, few blacks have 
75. See infra Part IV. 
76. 431 U.S. at 340 n.20. 
77. 433 U.S. 299 (1977). 
78. 433 U.S. at 308. 
79. 433 U.S. at 308 n.13. 
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had the opportunity to train as mechanical engineers. Although 40% 
of the community's general population is black, only .5% of its 
mechanical engineers are black. A mechanical engineering firm moves 
to town and begins hiring its staff. It aggressively seeks out black can-
didates, but because of their limited availability, the firm's work force 
ends up with only 5% black representation. If the unmodified Team-
sters test were applied, and the firm's work force were compared to the 
community's general population, a prima facie Title VII case of dis-
crimination might be made out against the employer. so This might 
seem unfair since in the direct discrimination context, an employer 
violates Title VII only if it is itself guilty of discrimination; it is not 
liable under the statute if its work force simply reflects a history of 
societal discrimination, 81 as in the case of the hypothetical engineering 
firm. The refined Hazelwood test would properly vindicate the em-
ployer from Title VII liability, and spare it even the burden of defend-
ing against a prima facie case, because - since the position of 
mechanical engineer is a skilled job category - the firm's work force 
would be compared to the racial composition of that "smaller group of 
individuals who possess the necessary qualifications." In that case, the 
employer's work force would actually have ten times greater black 
representation than the community's general pool of mechanical engi-
neers, and it could not be inferred that the employer had discriminated 
in hiring. In this hypothetical, a comparison between the employer's 
labor force and the general population would reveal the lingering ef-
80. After the Supreme Court's recent rulings in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 57 
U.S.L.W. 4583 (1989), however, a plaintiff in such a case would face significant new hurdles. 
First, the plaintiff would have to tie the statistical imbalance causally to some hiring standard or 
employment practice of the employer. "[A] Title VII plaintiff," the Court wrote, "does not make 
out a case of disparate impact simply by showing that, 'at the bottom line,' there is a racial 
imbalance in the work force. As a general matter, a plaintiff must demonstrate that it is the 
application of a specific or particular employment practice that has created the disparate impact 
under attack." 57 U.S.L.W. at 4587 (emphasis in original). Moreover, after Wards Cove, the 
plaintiff would have to go one step further and prove that the challenged employment practice 
was not a "business necessity." 57 U.S.L.W. at 4588. 
81. See, e.g .. Wards Cove, 51 U.S.L.W. at 4586 ("If the absence of minorities holding such 
skilled positions [on petitioner-employer's staff] is due to a dearth of qualified nonwhite appli-
cants (for reasons that are not petitioner's fault), petitioner's selection methods or employment 
practices cannot be said to have had a 'disparate impact' on nonwhites.") (footnote omitted). 
In Weber, the Court held that § 703(j) of Title VII expressly exempts from liability employers 
who simply fail to address "de facto racial imbalance[s]" in their work forces. 443 U.S. at 205· 
06. Section 703(j), 78 Stat. 257, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j), provides: 
Nothing contained in this title shall be interpreted to require any employer, employment 
agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee subject to this title to 
grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of the race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group on account of an imbalance 
which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin employed by any employer, referred or classified for employ-
ment by any employment agency or labor organization, admitted to membership or classi· 
fied by any labor organization, or admitted to, or employed in, any apprenticeship or other 
training program, in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of such 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in any community, State, section, or other area, 
or in the available work force in any community, State, section, or other area. 
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fects of the community's discriminatory history which discouraged or 
prevented blacks from training to become mechanical engineers; a 
comparison between the employer's labor force and the pool of 
mechanical engineers in the area, however, would test the actual hir-
ing practices of the employer against the actual availability of candi-
dates. A "gross disparity" in the latter comparison, if it could be tied 
to "a specific or particular employment practice,"82 could fairly sug-
gest discrimination by the particular employer regardless of the com-
munity's history. This is the heart of Title VII liability in the direct 
discrimination context. 
The Court's use of statistical evidence in the affirmative action con-
text grew out of its experience with such evidence in the direct dis-
crimination suits, and was gradually refined in much the same fashion. 
The affirmative action plan in Weber was justified by a comparison 
much like the one drawn in Teamsters: the racial composition of the 
employer's work force was compared to the racial composition of the 
area's general labor market without taking qualifications into ac-
count. 83 The Court then refined that test in Johnson, just as the Hazel-
wood Court had done earlier, to take qualifications into account. 
Consequently, the two-track test that emerged in Johnson was ex-
pressly founded upon the direct-discrimination case law: 
In determining whether an imbalance exists that would justify taking sex 
or race into account, a comparison of the percentage of minorities or 
women in the employer's work force with the percentage in the area 
labor market or general population is appropriate in analyzing jobs that 
require no special expertise, see Teamsters, or training programs 
designed to provide expertise, see Weber. Where a job requires special 
training, however, the comparison should be with those in the labor 
force who possess the relevant qualifications. See Hazelwood. 84 
III. APPLYING JOHNSON'S STATISTICAL TEST: DIFFICULT 
DISTINCTIONS AND INEVITABLE CONFUSION 
The "manifest imbalance" test set out in Johnson appears relatively 
straightforward. It instructs the judicial factfinder to look first to the 
job categories to which the contested affirmative action plan applies. 
Depending upon the nature of the job categories at stake, the composi-
tion of the employer's work force85 is then to be compared to the com-
82. Wards Cove, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4587; see supra note 80. 
83. See 443 U.S. at 198-99. 
84. 480 U.S. at 631-32 (full citations and parenthetical references omitted). 
85. Some confusion exists regarding whether it is appropriate to use for this purpose the 
employer's work force as a whole or only those of its employees in the particular job category to 
which the affirmative action plan applies. When the Johnson Court articulated the general test, it 
directed that the comparison be between the relevant area labor market and "the percentage of 
minorities or women in the employer's work force,'' without narrowing that class to particular 
job categories. See 480 U.S. at 632. Yet the Court also characterized the aim of the inquiry as 
the identification of "manifest imbalance[s] ... 'in traditionally segregated job categories.' " 480 
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position of the area's general population or labor market, or, 
alternatively, to the smaller pool of persons in the area qualified to do 
the job.86 
In practice, however, the test has led to a good deal of confusion. 
Uncertainties about how to apply the test have emerged on several 
fronts, including: 
(1) how should a court decide whether a particular job category 
does or does not require "special training"; 
(2) for those jobs that do require special skills, how should a court 
identify the pool of persons in the relevant labor market who possess 
those qualifications; 
(3) for those jobs that do not require special skills, should a court 
compare the employer's work force to the area's general population or 
its general labor market; 
(4) once the appropriate labor pool is identified, what is the proper 
geographic scope of the pool; 
(5) once the proper statistical pools are identified and compared, 
how "manifest" must the racial or gender imbalance be to justify vol-
untary use of class-conscious relief; and 
(6) which party should bear the burden of producing the necessary 
statistical evidence. 
U.S. at 631 (quoting Weber) (emphasis added). When the Court followed its own instruction to 
determine whether the requisite "manifest imbalance" existed in Santa Clara County's work 
force, it looked, at different points in its opinion, both to the county's total work force and to 
imbalances in specific job categories. For example, early in the opinion it noted that "while 
women constituted 36.4% of the area labor market, they composed only 22.4% of Agency em· 
ployees." 480 U.S. at 621. Later in its opinion, however, the Court seemed to place greater 
emphasis on a more detailed statistical breakdown that identified gender imbalances in each of 
several job categories affected by the county's affirmative action plan. See 480 U.S. at 634. The 
Court also noted approvingly that the county's plan "sought annually to develop even more 
refined measures of the underrepresentation in each job category." 480 U.S. at 635 (emphasis 
added). See also 480 U.S. at 637 (gender-conscious plan reasonable "(g]iven the obvious imbal· 
ance in the Skilled Craft category"). These references might suggest that, despite its more gener· 
alized instruction, the Court considered a comparison focusing on the racial or gender 
composition within specific job categories to be highly relevant, if not determinative, in detecting 
a manifest imbalance. 
In the months since Johnson, several lower courts have varied in their application of the test. 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, for example, in Higgins v. City of Vallejo, 823 F.2d 
351 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1310 (1989), upheld a voluntary affirmative action 
plan applied to upper-level jobs within the defendant-city's fire department on the basis of a 
comparison between the city's population and the municipal work force as a whole. The court 
then covered the bases by going on to note that "[t]he record also shows a racial imbalance 
within the City fire department," and then pointing out imbalances within each of three job 
categories within the fire department. 823 F.2d at 356. 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in considering an affirmative 
action plan in hiring and promotions adopted by the District of Columbia police department, 
found the requisite "manifest imbalance" by comparing the racial composition of the District's 
labor market with the racial composition of specific upper-level job classifications within the 
police department. See Ledoux v. District ofColum., 820 F.2d 1293, 1298 n.12, 1304 (D.C. Cir), 
rehg. granted, 833 F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1987), vacated, 841 F.2d 400 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
86. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
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Many of these questions are identical to those which courts have 
previously confronted in Title VII's direct discrimination context, and 
courts faced with Title VII challenges to affirmative action plans have 
naturally looked for guidance to those earlier cases. That familiarity 
· make$ finding answers to these questions no less difficult, however, 
since, despite many years of direct-discrimination case law, the courts 
have yet to discover a reliable method for handling the difficult factual 
determinations required. In the affirmative action context, lower 
courts have differed similarly in their resolution of these questions, 
and the differences have revealed just how complicated application of 
the "manifest imbalance" test can be. 
This Part examines each of these problem areas and the ways in 
which the courts have tried to resolve them. The examination suggests 
that although principled answers exist for questions (3) and (6) above, 
many of the factual determinations that courts are required to make 
by Johnson's two-track statistical test are extraordi!larily fine and may 
well be incapable of consistent resolution. This Part concludes by 
pointing out that the most troublesome of these questions, numbered 
(1) and (2) above, could be avoided altogether by application of the 
unified statistical test proposed in Part IV. -
A. The Nature of the Job 
According to Johnson, the first qµestion a court must answer in 
determining whether a manifest imbalance exists is whether the job 
categories involved require "special training" or "no special exper-
tise. "87 The Court has given only limited guidance in distinguishing 
skilled positions from unskilled. It has, for example, held that the po-
sition of truck driver requires no special qualifications because "the job 
skill there involved ... is one that many persons possess or can fairly 
readily acquire."88 Similarly, the Court has held that entry-level spots 
in a job training program require no special prior abilities because they 
are, in fact, "designed to provide expertise."89 Public school teachers, 
on the other hand, do work in a profession requiring special expertise, 
according to the Court. 90 
The opinions of several lower courts faced with Title VII chal-
lenges to voluntary affirmative action plans after Johnson suggest that 
it is not always easy to make the call when it comes to certain jobs. 91 
The D.C. Circuit, for example, expended little effort in finding that 
87. 480 U.S. at 632. 
88. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 n.13 (1977) (explaining the 
Court's decision in International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977)). 
89. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 632 (explaining the Court's decision in United Steelworkers of Am. 
v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979)). 
90. Hazelwood, 433 U.S. 299. 
91. This problem has also, of course, confronted courts dealing with Title VII "direct dis-
crimination" suits. See Smith & Abram, Quantitative Analysis and Proof of Employment Dis-
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entry-level firefighter positions required no special expertise and there-
fore compared the employer's work force to the area labor market, 
following Johnson's instructions.92 The Seventh Circuit, by contrast, 
looked at a similar entry-level job in the South Bend, Indiana, fire de-
partment and held that it was one requiring special qualifications.93 It 
therefore rejected the city's finding of a manifest imbalance based on a 
comparison of the racial composition of the city's fire department with 
its general population. The court justified this application by a curious 
and significant rephrasing of the Johnson test: 
The ax falls [on the city's affirmative action program] because the statis-
tical comparison upon which the city based its plan focused not on the 
relevant qualified area labor pool but on general population statistics. If 
a job category requires that applicants possess minimum qualifications, 
the City's proffered statistical comparison must narrow its focus to those 
actually qualified for the position.94 
The Seventh Circuit, by rejecting a comparison to general population 
statistics, implicitly found that the job skill required of entry-level 
firefighters was not "one that many persons possess or can fairly read-
ily acquire,"95 but was rather one that required a "special expertise."96 
crimination, 1981 U. ILL. L. REv. 33, 56 n.98 (comparing lower court opinions reaching opposite 
conclusions about seemingly identical job categories). 
92. Hammon v. Barry, 826 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2023 (1988). 
This conclusion must be inferred from the court's conclusion that "(u]nder Johnson's teaching, 
the percentage of blacks in the District's Fire Department is to be compared with the percentage 
of blacks in the area labor force." 826 F.2d at 77. Although the court narrowed the labor force 
to only persons between the ages of 20 to 28, it did not attempt to identify a smaller pool within 
that group possessing any special qualifications for the job. The court rejected a comparison 
proffered by the city which held the district's fire department up against the D.C. general popula· 
tion. But the only objection expressed by the court was to the geographic area used by the city; 
no objection was raised to the use of general population statistics. See 826 F.2d at 78. This 
suggests that the court believed that the entry-level firefighter positions in question did not re· 
quire the sort of "special training" that would dictate a co.mparison to a more specialized labor 
pool of persons "who possess the relevant qualifications." Johnson, 480 U.S. at 632. 
93. Janowiak v. Corporate City of South Bend, 836 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 
109 S. Ct. 1310 (1989). The Seventh Circuit suggested that its finding was consistent with Ham-
mon, which it read as drawing "a statistical comparison between the percentage of blacks in the 
District's fire department and the relevant qualified area labor pool." 836 F.2d at 1039 (empha· 
sis added). Hammon did not, however, expressly refer to any special qualifications required of 
entry-level firefighters and restricted the general area labor pool it used only by age. See supra 
note 92. 
94. 836 F.2d at 1039-40 (emphasis added). Johnson held that reference to a special qualified 
labor pool is necessary "(w]here a job requires special training." 480 U.S. at 632. The Seventh 
Circuit's application of that standard whenever a job requires "minimum qualifications" would 
seem to broaden its scope considerably. The Supreme Court held that the job of a truck driver, 
for example, does not require the "special expertise" intended by the Johnson test, although it 
surely requires certain "minimum qualifications." See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 632 (citing 
Teamsters). 
95. Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 308 n.13. 
96. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 632. This finding is implicit because the Seventh Circuit, by re· 
jecting a comparison to the general population, effectively distinguished its case from Teamsters, 
in which the Supreme Court accepted the use of general population statistics to find an imbalance 
among Teamster truck drivers. 
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The Seventh Circuit would apparently permit reference to an area's 
general population or generalized labor market only when the job cat-
egory at stake required no minimum qualifications at all; such job cat-
egories will become rare indeed in America's increasingly complex and 
technological job market. 
In sharp contrast to the narrow view taken by the Seventh Circuit, 
two other circuit courts of appeals have accepted the use of more gen-
eralized statistics in upholding affirmative action plans that applied to 
non-entry level job categories. The Ninth Circuit upheld a voluntary 
affirmative action plan as it applied to the upper ranks of a municipal 
fire department based upon reference to the city's general population 
in Higgins v. City of Vallejo. 97 Similarly, the D.C. Circuit upheld an 
affirmative action plan as it applied to detective positions within the 
D.C. police department in Ledoux v. District of Columbia based upon 
reference to the District's generalized labor market.98 Neither court 
demanded a comparison to a more specialized pool of area workers 
qualified to do the jobs, even though both positions quite arguably re-
quired "special training."99 
These different approaches among the circuit courts may reveal 
either how unclear it sometimes is whether a job category requires 
"special training," or how easy it is for a court to vary the classifica-
tion it applies depending on whether it is inclined to uphold or to 
strike down the contested plan. In either case, the inherent difficulties 
involved in deciding whether it requires "special skills" to work as a 
firefighter, a frycook, a launderer, or any of a thousand other job cate-
gories suggest that it would be preferable to avoid having to make the 
calculation at all, if that could be done consistently with the dictates of 
Title VII. 
B. Identifying the Proper Skilled Labor Pool 
If a court determines that the job category at stake is one requiring 
special skills, it may be an even more difficult matter to determine the 
97. 823 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1310 (1989). 
98: 820 F.2d 1293 (D.C. Cir.), rehg. granted, 833 F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1987), vacated, 841 
F.2d 400 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
99. The job category in Higgins was "firefighter-engineer," a rank higher than entry-level 
firefighters in the Vallejo fire department. The job category in Ledoux was "Detective Grade I," 
which the court described as "an upper-level position within the Department substantially 
equivalent to the rank of Sergeant" and two promotional ranks above entry-level. 820 F.2d at 
1294 & n.2. 
The Ledoux court acknowledged the plaintiffs' argument that reference should have been 
made to a more specialized qualified labor pool, but brushed it aside because, in the court's view, 
the burden was on the plaintiffs to produce such statistics. Plaintiffs' failure to do so at trial, the 
court held, meant that the court was free to base its comparison upon the generalized labor pool 
identified by the defendant-District. See 820 F.2d at 1304-05. This distribution of production 
burdens is the opposite of that imposed by the Seventh Circuit in Janowiak See infra section 
111.F (discussing production burdens under the Johnson test). 
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pool of workers who possess the necessary qualifications. Judge Ed-
wards, who wrote the D.C. Circuit's opinion in Ledoux, recently de-
scribed the problem: 
In the few cases where a job qualification is easily identifiable, this analy-
sis should not be difficult to perform. If, for example, the disputed job 
category requires employees to have a Ph.D. in biochemistry, it should 
be possible to ascertain the number of minorities or women in the rele-
vant labor market who possess that qualification .... 
The analysis does not end here, however, for in many cases involving 
skilled positions, the employer may not have such a specific and easily 
identifiable job requirement. For instance, it is unclear how one should 
determine the number of minorities or women in a relevant labor market 
who "possess the relevant qualifications" to be an assistant manager of a 
supermarket, to give but one example. The range of possible qualifica-
tions for this type of position is so broad that any effort to quantify the 
number of minorities or women who possess them may be little more 
than an exercise in futility. too 
Even when the job qualifications are relatively explicit, courts may 
be tempted to take shortcuts in defining the pool of qualified persons. 
The Supreme Court appears to have taken such a shortcut in Hazel-
wood, where it had to define the pool of persons qualified to work as 
teachers in the defendant's public school district. Instead of calculat-
ing the total pool of persons qualified to do the work (such as the total 
number of persons in the relevant geographic area holding state teach-
ing certificates), the Court simply looked to the pool of all persons 
then working as public school teachers in the larger metropolitan re-
gion, without attempting to take into account, as Judge Edwards ap-
parently would, additional persons not then working as teachers but 
qualified to do so.101 Since the pool of persons already employed in a 
"traditionally segregated" job category is likely to reflect past discrim-
inatory hiring practices, such a shortcut approach to calculating the 
qualified pool has properly been criticized for its effect of "locking in" 
existing underrepresentations caused by earlier discrimination.102 
The problems of identifying a pool of persons possessing "special 
qualifications" - skills which an employer itself may be hard put to 
quantify - are formidable. A court forced to identify such a pool 
might turn to a convenient proxy; such proxies, as the Hazelwood case 
illustrates, may seriously skew the fact-finding effort, and yet there 
may not always be a readily available alternative. These problems, 
too, highlight the undesirable choices demanded by Johnson's two-
track test. 
100. Edwards, supra note 52, at 779. Judge Edwards' solution to this problem is to put the 
burden on plaintiffs to produce data on such specialized statistical pools. See infra note 126 and 
accompanying text. 
101. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308, 310 (1977). 
102. See Smith & Abram, supra note 91, at 57. 
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C. Identifying the Proper Unskilled Labor Pool 
Some uncertainty also remains if a court concludes that the job 
category in question does not demand special skills. When the 
Supreme Court has faced such situations, it has compared the em-
ployer's work force both to the area's general population 103 and to the 
area's generalized labor market. 104 In Johnson, the Court reaffirmed 
both comparisons and suggested that either would be appropriate, ex-
pressing no preference between the alternative pools. 105 The choice 
may not make a difference in many cases so long as the racial or gen-
der composition of the area's general labor force mirrors that of the 
general population. If for some reason, however, those two pools vary, 
the choice may determine whether a manifest imbalance appears.106 
In these cases, it is preferable to refer to the area's labor market rather 
than its general population, because a sharp imbalance in the former 
comparison will reflect the lingering effects of past discrimination, 
whereas an imbalance in the latter comparison may reveal nothing at 
all about past discrimination.101 
103. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). 
104. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
105. 480 U.S. at 631-32 ("In determining whether an imbalance exists that would justify 
taking sex or race into account, a comparison of the percentage of minorities or women in the 
employer's work force with the percentage in the area labor market or general population is 
appropriate in analyzing jobs that require no special expertise ... or training programs designed 
to provide expertise.") (citing"Teamster.r, 431 U.S. 324, and Weber, 443 U.S. 193) (emphasis 
added). 
106. See Edwards, supra note 52, at 778 n.57 (citing B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOY-
MENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1351 n.240 (2d ed. 1983)); Rosenblum, The Use of Labor Statistics 
and Analysis in Title VII Cases: Rios, Chicago, and Beyond, 1 INDUS. REL. L.J. 685, 699-700 
(1977). 
107. As an illustration, suppose that in a particular community, the normal gender gap in 
longevity is especially wide: 80% of persons of retirement age are women. And, because this 
community is a popular retirement center with an attractive climate, half of the general popula-
tion is of retirement age. Consequently, although this community's population of working age 
persons is 50% female, the community's general population has a much higher representation of 
women, in the neighborhood of 65%. Now suppose a particular employer in this community has 
a work force in which half of the employees are women evenly dispersed throughout its several 
job categories. A comparison of this employer's work force with the area's general labor force 
would show no imbalance and would offer no suggestion of discrimination by the employer. A 
comparison to the general population would, however, show a disparity and might be enough to 
justify adoption of a voluntary affirmative action plan by the employer. The disparity revealed by 
the latter comparison suggests nothing more than the community's gender gap in longevity, how-
ever, and that should hardly be a sufficient basis for use of remedial gender-conscious preferences 
by the employer. A comparison to the area's general labor force, on the other hand, would 
exclude such variables as longevity and possible variations in fertility which are unrelated to 
discrimination. It is therefore a more reliable basis of comparison. See also supra note 106; D. 
BALDUS & J. COLE, supra note 73, at 116. ' 
An additional reason for relying on general labor force statistics rather than population data 
is that the former tend to be more current, whereas population data may be as much as 10 years 
old. Using the former data, therefore, may take into account possible alterations of the pool's 
composition due to intervening migration, thereby providing a more reliable reflection of the 
community. See Rosenblum, supra note 106, at 699-700. 
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D. The Proper Geographic Scope 
Even when courts and the parties can agree on the appropriate 
labor pool, disagreements may arise over the proper geographic mea-
sure of that pool. The issue was presented most sharply in two cases 
decided before the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit. Hammon v. Barry 108 involved a Title VII challenge to an affirm-
ative action program adopted by the District of Columbia fire 
department. In Ledoux v. District of Columbia, 109 plaintiffs challenged 
a similar plan employed by the D.C. police department. The two cases 
were heard by different panels of the D.C. Circuit, each of which de-
cided to compare the employers' work forces to the area labor market. 
In Ledoux, one panel, in an opinion written by Judge Edwards, relied 
primarily upon a labor pool confined to the geographic borders of the 
District of Columbia to find manifest racial and gender imbalances in 
the D.C. police force. 110 In Hammon, however, another panel, in an 
opinion written by former Judge Starr, insisted that looking only to 
the labor force of the District itself provided "an entirely artificial 
comparison"111 and that the relevant labor market extended into the 
D.C. suburbs in Maryland and Virginia. The larger geographical pool 
was the relevant measure, Judge Starr wrote, because it was the area 
from which the District recruited its new firefighters.112 
Judge Starr's reasoning would seem to find support from the juris-
108. 826 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2023 (1988). 
109. 820 F.2d 1293 (D.C. Cir.), rehg. granted, 833 F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1987), vacated, 841 
F.2d 400 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
110. The Ledoux court acknowledged the dispute over the proper geographic boundaries, but 
declined to rule on the issue conclusively: 
In concluding that there was a conspicuous imbalance in the Department's upper eche-
lons, the trial court relied on the District of Columbia as the applicable labor market, re-
jecting the appellants' contention that the relevant labor market was the Standard 
Metropolitan Statistical Area ("SMSA"), which includes the nearby suburbs of Maryland 
and Virginia. The record makes clear, however, that there was a manifest imbalance in the 
Department's labor force under either measure. Therefore, we need not decide whether the 
trial court erred in rejecting the SMSA as the relevant labor market. 
820 F.2d at 1304 n.18 (citation omitted). 
111. 826 F.2d at 78. 
112. The court explained: 
There should be no mistaking the correct benchmark in this case: the relevant labor force 
consists of persons 20 to 28 years of age in the Washington metropolitan area, not just within 
the confines of the Nation's capital. The reason is that it is undisputed that approximately 
half of the District's entry-level firefighters have hailed from the suburbs. 
826 F.2d at 77 (emphasis in original). Later, Judge Starr elaborated: 
Indeed, at last report, both traffic and commerce were moving freely between the District of 
Columbia and the thriving suburbs of Maryland and Virginia. To our knowledge, no Bran-
denburg Gate has yet been erected to prevent suburbanites from Silver Spring, Oxen Hill, or 
Alexandria from seeking employment in the D.C. Fire Department. And the much bally-
hooed six-month residency requirement requires new hires to quit their former haunts and 
move into the District within six months after being hired. Until conditions change, we will 
not bury our heads in the sand, ostrich-like, by ignoring the metropolitan area whence the 
entry-level firefighters actually come. 
826 F.2d at 78 n.8 (emphasis in original). 
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prudence in Title VII's "direct discrimination"113 context. The 
Supreme Court justified its reliance on a statistical disparity in Team-
sters, for example, by noting that "absent explanation, it is ordinarily 
to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time re-
sult in a work force more or less representative of the racial or ethnic 
composition of the population in the community from which employees 
are hired. " 114 
This leaves open the possibility, of course, that the proper geo-
graphic scope for some job categories may extend well beyond the city 
in which the employer is located. For job categories that demand 
highly specialized skills, the employer's recruiting field may well be 
national. In those cases, the employer's work force should be com-
pared to the racial or gender composition of the national labor market 
of qualified job candidates.11s 
The Court, however, has not yet given definitive guidance about 
precisely how to identify the appropriate geographic limits to a labor 
pool, and the question remains open to manipulation. Litigation in 
Title VII direct discrimination suits has similarly produced a wide va-
riety of geographical references, but no clear standard.116 In most 
cases, a court may be left to rely upon the recruiting zone actually 
used by an employer, unless it suspects that the selection of the zone 
113. "Direct discrimination" is meant to denote suits in which minority or female plaintiffs 
sue an employer, as distinguished from suits brought by white or male plaintiffs alleging "reverse 
discrimination." See supra Part II. 
114. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 n.20 (1977) (em-
phasis added); see also Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 315 & n.2 (1977) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The relevant labor market area is that area from which the employer 
draws its employees.") (quoting the court of appeals below, 534 F.2d 805, 811-12 n.7 (1976)); 
Reynolds v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 102, 498 F. Supp. 952, 969 (D.D.C. 1980) ("The proper 
geographic area for determining the relevant labor pool is where most of the applications origi-
nate."); Maehren v. City of Seattle, 92 Wash.2d 480, 599 P.2d 1255, 1264-66 (1979) (upholding 
City's affirmative action plan by using Seattle city limits as proper geographical labor pool; re-
jecting reference to the Seattle-Everett SMSA after finding that "the majority of the City's em~ 
ployees reside in Seattle and the City draws most of its work force from Seattle," even though 
some City employees lived in neighboring suburbs). See generally D. BALDUS & J. COLE, supra 
note 73, at 117-19. 
One commentator has proposed a detailed, five-point formula for defining the proper geo-
graphic scope of an employer's labor market based largely on "the area from which the current 
employees are drawn." See Dorsaneo, Statistical Evidence in Employment Discrimination Litiga-
tion: Selection of the Available Population, Problems, and Proposals, 29 Sw. L.J. 859, 868-69 
(1975). But see Note, Voluntary Affirmative Action Under Title VII and the Equal Protection 
Clause, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 711, 735 (1988) (arguing that employers be free to rely on city 
limits rather than larger metropolitan areas because otherwise "most affirmative action plans 
would not be able to be implemented"). 
115. See, e.g., Rosenblum, supra note 106, at 694; Note, Title VII and Employment Discrimi-
nation in "Upper Level" Jobs, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1614, 1626-27 (1973). 
116. See, e.g., F. MORRIS, CURRENT TRENDS IN THE USE (AND MISUSE) OF STATISTICS IN 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION 72-81 (1977) (surveying conflicting approaches 
and finding only "limited cohesion in the decisions of the courts as to the appropriate geographic 
boundaries"); Dorsaneo, supra note 114, at 866-69; Rosenblum, supra note 106, at 698-99; Smith 
& Abram, supra note 91, at 59-62; Note, Judicial Refinement of Statistical Evidence in Title VII 
Cases, 13 CONN. L. REV. 515, 529-31 (1981). 
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has itself been affected by discrimination. 117 
E. The Degree of Imbalance 
After Johnson, it also remains unclear just how much of an imbal-
ance is required before an employer may voluntarily adopt racial or 
gender preferences. Some clues can, however, be deduced. We know, 
for example, from past Court rulings what sort of statistical disparity 
is required to make out a prima facie case of direct discrimination 
against an employer. The "general rule" is that the disparity must be 
"greater than two or three standard deviations" before it can be in-
ferred that the employer has engaged in illegal discrimination under 
Title VII. 118 The Court has called that sort of imbalance a "gross 
statistical disparit[y]." 119 We know also from Johnson that in the vol-
untary affirmative action context the required "manifest imbalance 
need not be such that it would support a prima facie case against the 
employer."120 An employer after Johnson, therefore, can still show a 
sufficient imbalance to adopt an affirmative action plan even if the im-
balance in its work force is less than "two or three standard devia-
tions." 121 The Court has not gone further, however, in defining a floor 
117. It is, of course, possible that an employer's customary recruiting zone, i.e .. the area from 
which most of its employees are drawn, is itself discriminatory. An employer could, for example, 
deliberately recruit in distant suburbs as a device for avoiding hiring qualified minority candi-
dates within the employer's own city limits. Alternatively, an employer might set a particularly 
narrow recruiting zone for the purpose of avoiding recruiting in a nearby city with a large minor-
ity population, even though residents of that city would be interested in applying for jobs with 
the employer. Courts should, therefore, scrutinize an employer's recruiting practices before rely-
ing on them to define the proper geographic scope of the relevant labor market. See D. BALDUS 
& J. COLE, supra note 73, at 119; Note, supra note 115, at 1626-27. 
The Supreme Court seemed to acknowledge this obligation of scrutiny in Wards Cove Pack-
ing Co. v. Atonio, 57 U.S.L.W. 4583 (1989). There, it noted that an employer could not be held 
liable under a Title VII disparate impact theory if racial imbalance in its work force merely 
reflected "a dearth of qualified nonwhite applicants" in the community. 57 U.S.L. W. at 4586. It 
then added as an aside: "Obviously, the analysis would be different if it were found that the 
dearth of qualified nonwhite applicants was due to practices on [the employer's] part which -
expressly or implicitly - deterred minority group members from applying •••. " 57 U.S.L.W. 
4586 n.7. Justice Stevens, in his dissent, also suggested that the employer's practice of "re-
cruit[ing] employees for [upper-level] at-issue jobs from outside the work force rather than from 
lower-paying, overwhelmingly nonwhite, cannery worker positions" in the lower ranks of its 
work force might indicate discrimination. See 57 U.S.L.W. at 4593 (Stevens, J., dissenting), 
118. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 497 n.17 (1977); see also Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 308 
n.14. 
119. Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 307. 
120. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S. 616, 632 (1987) 
(emphasis added). 
121. There is reason to argue that voluntary affirmative action should be permitted even if 
the imbalance is substantially less than two or three standard deviations. Some statisticians have 
pointed out that the degree of imbalance required to make out a prima facie Title VII violation, 
i.e .. two or three standard deviations, is exceedingly exacting and "seems better suited to a crimi-
nal or quasi-criminal standard of proof" than to a simple preponderance test. See Dawson, Are 
Statisticians Being Fair to Employment Discrimination Plaintijfr?, 21 JURJMETRJCS J, 1 (1980); 
Henkel & McKeown, Unlawful Discrimination and Statistical Proof: An Analysis, 22 
JURIMETRICS J. 34, 58 (1981). If it is true that the Hazelwood formulation tends to exculpate 
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beneath which an imbalance will not be considered sufficiently 
"manifest."122 
F. The Proper Burdens of Production 
Lower courts applying the Johnson "manifest imbalance" test have 
also differed over how to assign the burden of producing the statistical 
evidence. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, for example, 
has placed that burden directly on employers who seek to justify their 
voluntary use of race or gender preferences. In the Seventh Circuit 
case of Janowiak v. Corporate City of South Bend, 123 the defendant-city 
had produced evidence comparing the racial composition of its fire 
department to the city's general population. The court, however, held 
that the city was required to identify a more narrow statistical pool of 
city residents who were qualified to work as entry-level firefighters. 124 
The city's failure to produce the desired statistics resulted in the inval-
idation of its affirmative action program. 
One panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit, however, took precisely the opposite approach in Ledoux v. 
District of Columbia. There the court was presented with much the 
same situation as the court in Janowiak· the defendant had presented 
statistics regarding the general area labor market, while the plaintiffs 
insisted that the proper reference was to a specialized qualified labor 
pool. Instead of invalidating the District's affirmative action plan 
based on defendant's failure to offer more focused statistics, however, 
the D.C. Circuit upheld the plan based onplaintijfs'failure to do so. 125 
Judge Edwards, who wrote the court's opinion in Ledoux, later ex-
plained his approach more fully: if the job category to which an af-
firmative action plan applies cleariy does involve "specific and 
identifiable qualifications," the employer should proffer statistical evi-
dence regarding the labor pool of persons qualified to do the job; if, 
however, the qualifications are not "specific and identifiable," making 
it difficult to determine the relevant labor pool, the employer may rely 
on reference to the general area labor pool and . the burden shifts to 
plaintiffs to offer more precise statistical pools if warranted: 
[I]t is probably sufficient in cases where job qualifications are difficult to 
define to use the total number of minorities or women in the relevant 
even employers who have in fact discriminated illegally, and if it is also true that employers need 
not show evidence of their own discrimination in order to adopt voluntary affirmative action, 
then it would seem inappropriate to require them to show anything close to the stringent degree 
of imbalance required in Hazelwood. 
122. See also Edwards, supra note 52, at 782-83 (acknowledging uncertainty in measuring the 
degree of imbalance required by Johnson). 
123. 836 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1310 (1989). 
124. 836 F.2d at 1039-40. 
125. Ledoux v. District of Colum., 820 F.2d 1293, 1304-05 (D.C. Cir.), rehg. granted, 833 
F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1987), vacated, 841 F.2d 400 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
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labor market as a proxy for qualified candidates in measuring manifest 
imbalance, unless the nonminority or male plaintiffs can demonstrate 
that a narrower, more accurate measure can be devised. In other words 
the ultimate burden of proof should rest with the party seeking to em-
ploy a more refined stati~tical analysis . 
. . . If a plan covers assistant supermarket managers, for example, or 
other jobs whose qualifications are difficult to identify, the burden of pro-
ducing refined statistical evidence reasonably should rest on the party 
who seeks their introduction - the nonminority or male employees in 
this instance. This approach is consistent with that taken in disparate 
impact cases.126 
Judge Edwards has defended his approach to production burdens 
based on "practical considerations" concerning the difficulty of identi-
fying such refined pools for many job categories. 127 He also argues 
that it is consistent with statements in Johnson and Wygant stressing 
that the ultimate burden of proof rests on plaintiffs seeking to invali-
date voluntary affirmative action plans. 12s 
At any rate, the Seventh Circuit clearly seems to be misapplying 
Johnson in its continued willingness to invalidate affirmative action in 
cases where both plaintiff and defendant fail to produce sufficiently 
refined statistical evidence.129 That approach flies in the face of John-
son's explicit instruction that an affirmative action plan is not to be 
treated as an affirmative defense in which the defending party is re-
quired to prove not only the existence of an affirmative action plan but 
the plan's validity as wen.130 
126. Edwards, supra note 52, at 779-81 (emphasis in original). 
127. Id. at 779, 781. 
128. Id. at 781 (citing Wygant, 476 U.S. 267, 277-78 (1986) (plurality opinion) and Johnson, 
480 U.S. 616, 626 (1987)). 
129. See Cygnar v. City of Chicago, 865 F.2d 827 (7th Cir. 1989); Janowiak v. Corporate 
City of South Bend, 836 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1310 (1989). 
130. The Court held: 
As a preliminary matter, we note that petitioner bears the burden of establishing the 
invalidity of the Agency's Plan. Only last Term in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 
we held that "[t]he ultimate burden remains with the employees to demonstrate the uncon-
stitutionality of an affirmative-action program,'' and we see no basis for a different rule 
regarding a plan's alleged violation of Title VII. . . . Once a plaintiff establishes a prima 
facie case that race or sex has been taken into account in an employer's employment deci-
sion, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a nondiscriminatory rationale for its 
decision. The existence of an affirmative action plan provides such a rationale. If such a 
plan is articulated as the basis for the employer's decision, the burden shifts to the plaintiff 
to prove that the employer's justification is pretextual and the plan is invalid. As a practical 
matter, of course, an employer will generally seek to avoid a charge of pretext by presenting 
evidence in support of its plan. That does not mean, however, as petitioner suggests, that 
reliance on an affirmative action plan is to be treated as an affirmative defense requiring the 
employer to carry the burden of proving the validity of the plan. The burden of proving its 
invalidity remains on the plaintiff. 
480 U.S. at 626-27 (citations omitted). 
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IV. THE NEED FOR A NEW STATISTICAL TEST 
Many of the difficulties discovered by the lower courts in applying 
the Johnson "manifest imbalance" test have confronted them before in 
analyzing statistical evidence presented in Title VII "direct discrimi-
nation" suits. 131 It should not be surprising, therefore, that some 
lower courts have turned to the direct discrimination case law in try-
ing to resolve these challenges in the use of statistics.132 The two-track 
Johnson test is itself, after all, rooted directly in cases like Teamsters 
and Hazelwood, which sought to prove racial discrimination by em-
ployers against black employees or job candidates. 133 In light of the 
wider tolerance of voluntary affirmative action which has emerged 
from the Court's opinions in Weber and Johnson, however, it is rea-
sonable to inquire whether the tests developed in Teamsters and Ha-
zelwood fit so neatly into the voluntary affirmative action context. 
This Part begins by reviewing the Court's findings in Weber about 
the central emphasis Congress placed on voluntary remedial efforts 
when it drafted Title VII. Section IV.B then argues that the two-track 
statistical test required by Johnson serves to defeat a wide range of the 
voluntary efforts desired by Congress and lauded by the Court. Sec-
tion IV.C proposes a unified statistical test that would, regardless of 
the job skills involved, always compare the composition of an em-
ployer's work force with that of the area's general labor market in 
determining whether the requisite "manifest imbalance" exists - a 
test that would avoid many of the difficult problems outlined in Part 
III while better serving Congress' aim of encouraging private remedial 
efforts. 
A. The Importance of Voluntary Solutions 
Two findings made by the Court about the legislative history of 
Title VII are especially relevant in setting the legal boundaries for vol-
untary affirmative action programs. First, the Court has stressed Con-
gress' broad remedial purpose in enacting the law. 134 Second, the 
Court has found that Congress intended to encourage voluntary efforts 
to achieve the Act's social aims. 135 When the Court described in 
Weber the congressional concerns animating Title VII, it did not 
speak in terms of combatting specific acts of employer discrimination. 
131. For sources reviewing the complexities of statistical analysis in Title VII direct discrimi-
nation suits and the often conflicting approaches taken by the lower courts, see supra note 116. 
See generally D. BALDUS & J. COLE, supra note 73. 
132. Judge Edwards, for example, relied explicitly on Title VII's disparate impact case law in 
developing his approach to assigning the respective burdens of production and proof. See Ed-
wards, supra note 52, at 780-81. 
133. See supra Part II. 
134. See United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202-03 (1979). 
135. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 204-06; Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 
Cal., 480 U.S. 616, 630 & n.8, 640-42 (1987). 
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Rather, it emphasized the institutional economic barriers that perpetu-
ated the concentration of black workers in the lower echelons of the 
American work force: "centuries of racial injustice"136 were keeping 
black workers in the bottom ranks of the economy; automation was 
replacing these jobs, worsening the gap between black and white un-
employment rates. 137 The evils identified by Congress and emphasized 
by the Court went beyond overt racist acts to include structural eco-
nomic disadvantage. While Title VII certainly and necessarily aimed 
at outlawing individual instances of employment discrimination, its ul-
timate purpose went further: to tear down barriers of historical and 
entrenched disadvantage that perpetuate a de facto segregated job 
market. 138 Congress' and the Court's emphatic embrace of voluntary 
efforts to achieve that end reaffirms that voluntary affirmative action is 
permissible if grounded in an effort to cure that "social malaise"139 by 
remedying the lingering effects of more than 250 years of race and sex 
discrimination. Affirmative action, of course, must be remedial - it 
must still be aimed at undoing the effects of discrimination. 140 But in 
the voluntary context, the Court does not insist upon evidence that the 
employer itself has discriminated. 141 Instead, the discrimination 
which may provide the remedial basis here is described by the Court in 
terms of "traditional patterns of racial segregation,"142 "old patterns 
of racial segregation and hierarchy,"143 or "the ... vestiges of an un-
fortunate and ignominious page in this country's history."144 In the 
context of voluntarily adopted measures, it is sufficient that an affirma-
tive action plan be designed "to open employment opportunities for 
Negroes in occupations which have been traditionally closed to 
them."145 The Court found in Congress' actions "a desire to preserve 
a relatively large domain for voluntary employer action," to permit a 
wider latitu,de for voluntary race- or gender-conscious preferences 
than that allowed to courts in ordering such remedies.146 
136. Weber, 443 U.S. at 204. 
137. See 443 U.S. at 202. 
138. The Court held in Weber, for example, that Congress did not intend Title VII to pro-
hibit employers from voluntarily seeking to remedy "de facto racial imbalance[s]" in their work 
forces. 443 U.S. at 205-06 (italics in original). 
139. 443 U.S. at 202 (quoting remarks of Sen. Clark, 110 CONG. REC. 7220 (1964)). 
140. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
141. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 630; see supra section II.D. 
142. Weber, 443 U.S. at 201. 
143. 443 U.S. at 208; Johnson, 480 U.S. at 628 (citing Weber). 
144. 443 U.S. at 204. 
145. 443 U.S. at 203 (quoting remarks of Sen. Humphrey regarding Title VIl's purpose and 
finding voluntary employer action consistent with that purpose, 110 CONG. REC. 6548 (1964)). 
146. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 631 n.8. 
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B. From Hazelwood to Johnson 
Yet, the two-track test for finding manifest imbalance adopted in 
Johnson is ill-suited to preserve the wider latitude for voluntary reme-
dies emphasized by the Court. That test - requiring reference to a 
specialized qualified labor market when a job category demands spe-
cial skills - was designed in Hazelwood for the explicit purpose of 
calculating whether an employer is guilty of past discrimination. The 
test is engineered to compare the number of minorities or women 
hired to the number of minorities or women available to do the job. 
The Hazelwood test excludes unqualified minorities or women from 
the comparative pool because the employer cannot be faulted for fail-
ing to hire unqualified candidates; illegal discrimination can be in-
ferred only if it appears that the employer has systematically failed to 
hire qualified minorities or women. For this reason, the test devised in 
Hazelwood is perfectly suited to its purpose in that setting: evaluating 
past employer conduct. 
The purpose of the manifest imbalance test in Johnson is not, how-
ever, the evaluation of employer conduct. Because of the broad reme-
dial purpose of Title VII and the wider latitude for voluntary action 
identified by the Court, voluntary affirmative action need not be 
grounded in past discrimination by the employer adopting the rem-
edy.147 Yet Johnson, after insisting that "an employer seeking to jus-
tify the adoption of a plan need not point to its own prior 
discriminatory practices, nor even to evidence of an 'arguable viola-
tion' on its part,"148 goes on to require that the employer draw a statis-
tical comparison that is designed to evaluate the likelihood of prior 
discriminatory practices by the employer. That result seems to con-
flict squarely with the rule which has emerged from Weber and John-
son allowing voluntary affirmative action even when the employer is 
merely trying to remedy de facto imbalances iri its work force that may 
have resulted from a societal history of race or sex discrimination, 
rather than invidious practices by the employer itself. 
The contrariness of the result can be illustrated by a hypothetical. 
Suppose that five of the attorneys working at a 100-member law firm 
are black. Although the general labor market of the community in 
which the firm is located is forty-percent black, its labor market of 
attorneys is also only five-percent black. Under the two-track Johnson 
test, the employer would not be permitted to adopt an affirmative ac-
tion plan to promote the hiring of new black attorneys. Since the job 
147. See, e.g., Ledoux v. District of Colum., 820 F.2d 1293, 1304 n.18 (D.C. Cir.) ("The 
Court made clear in Johnson, however, that the first prong of the test [finding a "manifest imbal-
ance"] may be satisfied by an adequate statistical showing; the trial court need not venture into 
the thicket of determining the root causes of the existing imbalance."), rehg. granted, 833 F.2d 
368 (D.C. Cir. 1987). vacated, 841 F.2d 400 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see also supra Part I. 
148. 480 U.S. at 630. 
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category involved requires "special training," the employer would be 
required to compare the racial composition of its attorney staff to the 
area's pool of attorneys. No imbalance would appear, and racial pref-
erences, therefore, could not be used. Yet it does not seem entirely 
consistent with the Court's reading of Title VII's broad remedial pur-
pose, nor with its emphasis on a wider latitude for voluntary action, to 
strike down affirmative action in this situation. The disparity between 
the percentage of blacks in the general labor market and the percent-
age of blacks working as attorneys would clearly be rooted in "old 
patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy." The gap obviously 
would reflect "the fact that [blacks] had not traditionally been em-
ployed in these positions, and that they had not been strongly moti-
vated to seek training or employment in them 'because of the limited 
opportunities that have existed in the past for them to work in such 
classifications.' " 149 Furthermore, it would reflect a history of even 
more overt discrimination that has denied blacks admission to law 
schools and employment in white-owned law firms. Given Title VIl's 
purpose of seeking to "break down old patterns of racial segregation 
and hierarchy" and "to eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges of 
an unfortunate and ignominious page in this country's history,"150 and 
given the Court's emphasis on the "crucial role" 151 of voluntary efforts 
to that end, it would seem desirable to permit just the sort of affirma-
tive action proposed by the hypothetical law firm above. A voluntary 
affirmative action plan adopted in such a setting could serve very well 
Title VII's aim of integrating minorities and women into the economic 
mainstream by encouraging their entry into "traditionally segregated 
job categories." 
C. Toward a Unified Statistical Test 
The Johnson "manifest imbalance" test, as currently constituted, 
can subvert this purpose. A unification of its two-track approach -
eliminating the need to refer to narrower qualified labor pools when 
evaluating skilled job categories - could, however, cure this defect. 
Under such a test, the composition of the employer's work force 
would in all cases be compared to the composition of the area's general 
labor pool. Job qualifications would not be taken into account. Such a 
unified test would detect the presence of the only predicate Johnson 
requires: the lingering impact of past discrimination. It would not go 
the next step, as the two-track test currently does, by analyzing, in 
effect, whether that discrimination can be traced to the individual em-
ployer. This unified standard would permit voluntary affirmative ac-
149. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 621 (explaining the historical basis for the manifest gender imbal-
ance found in that case). 
150. See supra notes 143-44. 
151. 480 U.S. at 630. 
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tion whenever a manifest imbalance exists between an employer's 
work force and the area's general labor market, as in the case of the 
hypothetical law firm. Under the allocation of burdens of proof 
adopted by Johnson, the plaintiffs would still have the opportunity to 
prove that the imbalance can be explained by factors other than dis-
crimination by the employer or society at large. 152 But if the plaintiffs 
cannot offer a convincing nondiscriminatory explanation, it could be 
reasonably inferred that the imbalance reflects the lingering impact of 
a history of discrimination in the community. 153 
A unified "manifest imbalance" test would have several advan-
tages. First, it would allow employers to use affirmative action to 
eliminate effects of discrimination that presently are beyond their 
reach. In that respect, it would better serve the broad remedial pur-
pose of Title VII identified by the Court in Weber and Johnson. Sec-
ond, a unified standard would eliminate many of the difficulties related 
to applying Johnson's two-track test. 154 The confusion that has con-
fronted lower courts in deciding whether a given job category de-
mands "special expertise," in identifying specialized pools of 
"qualified" workers, and in assigning the burden of producing more 
refined statistical evidence could be avoided entirely. Although parties 
might continue to disagree over the proper geographic boundaries, 
identifying an area's general labor market presents none of the more 
vexing complications. A unified test would, therefore, not only be bet-
ter tailored to the policies animating Title VII scrutiny of voluntary 
affirmative action programs, it would also be significantly more practi-
cal to apply. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Ever since 1979, when the Supreme Court first made clear that 
private employers may voluntarily adopt affirmative action under at 
least some circumstances without violating the Title VII protections of 
majority employees or job candidates, 155 litigants and judges have 
struggled to define exactly what those circumstances are. Eight years 
later, the Court provided added clarity in Johnson v. Transportation 
Agency, Santa Clara County, California, 156 in which it held that em-
ployers have wider freedom under Title VII to use affirmative action 
than they do under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth 
amendment. 157 An employer may use affirmative action without run-
ning afoul of Title VII, the Court held, if "justified by the existence of 
152. See supra section III.F. 
153. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
154. See supra Part III. 
155. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
156. 480 U.S. 616 (1987). 
157. See supra Part I.A. 
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a 'manifest imbalance' that reflect[s] underrepresentation of women 
[or minorities] in 'traditionally segregated job categories,' " 158 and so 
long as application ()f the plan does not "unnecessarily trammel" the 
rights of majority employees. 1s9 
The Court's insistence in Johnson that employers subject to Title 
VII have greater leeway in employing race- or gender-conscious reme-
dial preferences than do employers subject to the fourteenth amend-
ment suggests that the remedial scope permitted private employers is 
larger than that allowed public employers. While the Court has been 
consistent in demanding that public employers may act to remedy 
only discrimination traceable to their own practices, 160 it has consist-
ently and explicitly demanded less of private employers. 161 A careful 
review of the Court's holdings in Weber and Johnson strongly suggests 
that the Court has interpreted Title VII to permit private emloyers162 
to use affirmative action even when it is designed to remedy, not the 
employer's own discriminatory acts, but those of society at large that 
have affected the composition of the employer's work force. 
Unfortunately, however, the precise statistical test directed by the 
Johnson Court for detecting the existence of the requisite "manifest 
imbalance" has led to considerably less clarity in subsequent applica-
tion. The Court's requirement that the racial or gender composition 
of the employer's work force be compared to different outside refer-
ence pools depending upon whether the job categories at issue demand 
"special training" 163 has resulted in varying and often confused appli-
cation, as lower courts have struggled to pigeonhole different job cate-
gories and devise proxy pools of local populations possessing the 
requisite skills.164 Moreover, Johnson's two-track statistical test cen-
tering on job skills can block employers from voluntarily adopting the 
sort of wide-ranging remedial measures that the Court has suggested 
they are entitled to employ, frustrating what has been identified as the 
driving purpose of Title VII. 
A unified statistical test, which disregards job skills and in all cases 
compares the employer's work force to the local general labor market, 
would detect the existence of discrimination in the employer's work 
force without necessarily attributing that discrimination to the em-
ployer itself. Such a test "provides assurance ... that sex or race will 
be taken into account in a manner consistent with Title VIl's purpose 
158. 480 U.S. at 631. 
159. 480 U.S. at 637; see supra note 11. 
160. See supra note 20. 
161. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 630 & n. 8; Weber. 443 U.S. 193. 
162. Or public employers who, like the defendant-county in Johnson, are for whatever reason 
not faced with constitutional challenges. 
163. See supra text accompanying note 84. 
164. See supra Part III. 
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of eliminating the effects of employment discrimination";165 at the 
same time, however, a unified test would spare courts from having to 
decide the fine-drawn questions about whether a given job category 
requires "special training" and, if so, how to define the pool of persons 
possessing the necessary skills. More important, a unified test "'.Ould 
permit employers voluntarily to undertake efforts to remedy one of the 
most vexing and pressing of national problems: the 'legacy of more 
than three centuries of far-reaching, systematic societal discrimination 
now imbedded in stubborn inequalities of wealth, employment, and 
overall quality of life. 
- David D. Meyer 
165. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 632. 
